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ABSTRACT

Hammons, Joseph J. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State
University, 2021. Exploitation and Domination: A Marxist Analysis of the Impact of
Class Structure on State Terrorism.

This study qualitatively examines the impact of three socio-economic inequalities on
state terrorism: (1) income inequality; (2) unequal collective labor rights; and (3) land
inequality. It proposes a theory of class structure and state terrorism based on the Marxist
theory of exploitation and domination and uses Marxist class analysis in the comparison
of two case studies, Brazil (1985-1990) and the Philippines (1986-1992), to determine
which of the three socio-economic inequalities is most likely to lead to class struggle that
will prompt the state to respond with terrorism. Findings from this study indicate that
issues concerning land inequality may be a main driver of state terrorism in these two
cases.
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I. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON STATE TERRORISM
Introduction
State terrorism has been and remains an exceptionally destructive form of
political violence. Throughout history, states have often employed terrorism as a means
to influence and control both internal and external populations. While non-state actors
also use terrorism as a means to meet political objectives, the number of people killed by
state terrorism far exceeds those killed by non-state actors. Jackson, Murphy and
Poynting argue:
[I]n comparison to the terrorism perpetrated by non-state insurgent groups,
the few thousand deaths and injuries caused by ‘terrorism from below’
every year pales into relative insignificance besides the hundreds of
thousands of people killed, kidnapped, ‘disappeared’, injured, tortured,
raped, abused, intimidated, and threatened by state agents and their proxies
in dozens of countries across the globe (Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting
2010, 1).

However, despite a disproportionately greater number of deaths being attributed to state
terrorism than the terrorism of non-state actors, mainstream terrorism scholarship is
overwhelmingly focused on the latter (Blakeley 2007; Jackson 2008).
States not only use terrorism as a means to shape how populations will behave
politically, but they also employ terrorism in order to secure obedience from workers
within the economic sphere. As Blakeley notes: “[S]tates have frequently used violence
to terrorize a wider audience so that they subordinate themselves to the wishes of the
state. Those wishes may, of course, include lending political support to the state, but
those wishes may also involve citizens laboring in the interests of elites” (Blakeley 2010,
1

chap. 1, 15). This economic dimension of state terrorism suggests that class structure can
significantly determine whether states use terrorism against their own citizens, raising the
potential research question: How does class structure impact the degree of state terrorism
within a particular country? And more specifically, what are the potential causal
mechanisms found within class relations that trigger the use of terrorism by the state?
This research specifically focuses on the terrorism used by states against their own
citizenry as an instrument of internal governance.
The proposed research question is significant for three reasons. First, there is a
lack of scholarship on state terrorism compared to the scholarship on the terrorism of
non-state actors, despite state terrorism’s disproportionately greater destructiveness to
human life. Therefore, by providing further research on state terrorism, one contributes
to remedying this scholarly imbalance within the broader field of terrorism studies.
Second, answering the proposed research question requires the development of a theory
that explains potential causes of state terrorism. The current literature on state terrorism
contains an abundance of empirical case studies that provide descriptive accounts of state
terrorism, but it lacks theories that have the potential to explain the root causes of this
form of political violence. Therefore, by addressing the proposed research question, one
contributes a theory to a field of study in which there is a theoretical scarcity. Third, the
research question is timely because of the current interest in illegitimate police violence
perpetrated against people of color holding lower socio-economic status within the
United States and around the world. The following review primarily focuses on the
literature on state terrorism found in critical terrorism studies (with one exception), rather
than providing a broad overview of all of the literature on state terrorism.
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Critical Terrorism Studies
Critical terrorism studies (CTS) emerged in the early 2000s, officially in 2008
with the first publication of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism (Smyth et al. 2008).
CTS examines terrorism through the lens of critical theory, a philosophical approach
originating in the Frankfurt School, which attempts to expose and challenge power
structures that are entrenched in contemporary society. Critical theory utilizes social
scientific research to provide a critique of social relations, and questions how knowledge
is produced within these relations and to whom this knowledge benefits. As CTS
scholars Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, and Smyth point out:
[C]ritical approaches…acknowledge that theory and knowledge always
come from somewhere; that is, it is located in, and reflects, the values and
assumptions of the particular historical and social context in which it
emerges. Critical theorists thus not only question whether completely
objective knowledge and theory is possible; they also question who benefits
by claiming that it is (Jackson et al. 2011, 20).
CTS scholars, by extension, provide a critique of the knowledge produced by
orthodox terrorism studies, which is perceived as emerging from within “a particular kind
of political, legal, cultural, and academic context” (Smyth et al. 2008, 1). This context
consists of the publication of an excessive number of academic books and articles on
terrorism each year, as well as an overabundance of cultural products concerning
terrorism, such as novels, media articles, and films (Smyth et al. 2008, 1-2). Within this
context, politicians frequently inflate the threat posed by terrorism for political
advantage, and the population focuses largely on the violent aspect of terrorism “to the
neglect of the wider social, historical, and often mundane milieu in which it is situated”
(Smyth et al. 2008, 2). Most relevant to this thesis, however, is the lack of attention
devoted within this context to the more widespread phenomenon of state terrorism,
3

including terrorism employed or supported by liberal-democratic states, which CTS
scholars argue “has been ignored and silenced from the public, and to a significant
degree, academic discourse” (Smyth et al. 2008, 2). Blakeley (2007), a CTS scholar,
finds two main factors that contribute to this silence on state terrorism within the broader
terrorism discourse, specifically the state terrorism linked to liberal-democratic states of
the Global North. The first factor concerns the theoretical framework used by orthodox
terrorism scholars. Blakeley argues:
Accepting an orthodoxy within IR [International Relations] that
characterises the foreign policies of Northern democracies as largely
benign, terrorism is understood to mean activities by non-state actors,
often located in the South, against Northern democracies and their
interests; state terrorism, when it is discussed, is assumed to constitute
support for terrorists by ‘rogue’ states (Blakeley 2007, 233).
The second factor concerns the fact that many of the leading terrorism scholars are
affiliated with institutions connected to state power. Blakeley contends: “The exclusion
of state terrorism from current usage of the term ‘terrorism’ means that terrorism studies
scholars function to promote particular political agendas,” which ultimately “serve
particular national, sectional or class interests” (Blakeley 2007, 233).
Blakeley provides suggestions for addressing the factors that she finds contribute
to a scarcity of scholarship on the terrorism of liberal-democratic states within orthodox
terrorism studies. To move forward within the field, she recommends applying
normative approaches to the study of terrorism. Blakeley argues that normative
approaches “enable us to overcome certain biases in the field, including the selective
application of terms such as ‘terrorism’ that serves to fortify rather than confront illiberal
practices” (Blakeley 2007, 234). Furthermore, she believes these approaches “help to
diversify and broaden debate beyond the narrow parameters set by the dominant, neo4

realist and liberal approaches within IR” (Blakeley 2007, 234). But most importantly,
Blakeley suggests that there is an urgent need to focus on the state as a perpetrator of
terrorism, and this includes all states along the ideological spectrum. She argues:
“Because terrorism is a tactic and not an ideology, states of any kind can be perpetrators
of terrorism….The field of terrorism studies therefore needs to reintegrate the state as a
potential instigator of terrorism, into the debate” (Blakeley 2007, 234). Blakeley points
out, however, that focusing only on the terrorism of liberal-democratic states would
create additional biases within terrorism studies (Blakeley 2007, 234). Additionally, to
further the understanding of state terrorism, she recommends that scholars analyze how
states work together to commit terrorist acts. Blakeley writes: “We can better understand
state terrorism when we examine the collaborations that are established between elites
across state boundaries” (Blakeley 2007, 234). While Blakeley concludes that there is a
relative absence of scholarship on state terrorism within the broader terrorism literature,
and that this absence requires greater attention to be given to state terrorism, some
important literature on state terrorism has been produced prior to the emergence of CTS.
CTS Conceptual Antecedent
Some terrorism scholars have conducted serious research on state terrorism before
the formation of CTS, and continue to do so outside of CTS, but “these scholars and this
literature exist largely on the periphery of the terrorism studies field” (Jackson 2008,
380). Some of this research has shaped the perspectives of CTS scholars and is often
cited in the CTS literature. Significant contributions to the study of state terrorism include
Chomsky and Herman (1979), Herman (1982), Duvall and Stohl (1988), Stohl (1988),
and George (1991). Most relevant to this thesis is the work of Duvall and Stohl (1988).
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Duvall and Stohl (1988) develop a general concept of terrorism and extend this
concept to include state terrorism. They define terrorism as “action intended to induce
sharp fear and through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict situation”
(Duvall and Stohl 1988, 234). They clarify which actions this concept of terrorism does
not include. First, terrorism does not include “any and all actions that produce terror”
(Duvall and Stohl 1988, 234). A violent action directed at a victim that may happen to
instill terror in a witness to that violence is not considered terrorism if the primary
intention of the violent action was not to produce terror in that witness. Second,
terrorism does not include “any and all coercive, forceful, or violent actions” (Duvall and
Stohl 1988, 235). An action that is intended to physically harm or destroy the victim is
not considered terrorism if that is its primary aim, rather than the goal of producing terror
in a witness to the violence directed at the victim. Third, terrorism does not include “all
fear-inducing strategies” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 236). For example, threats
communicated to a potential victim, which if followed through by the perpetrator would
physically harm or destroy the potential victim, is not considered terrorism because the
fear is not induced in a witness who is distinct from the threatening action. According to
Duvall and Stohl, actions that are considered (state) terrorism must meet three
definitional criteria:
First, threatened or perpetrated violence is directed at some victim. Second,
the violent actor (for us, an agency of the state) intends that violence to
induce terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim –
the victim is instrumental. Third, the violent actor (agency of the state)
intends or expects that the terrorized witness will effectuate a desired
outcome, either directly (in which case the witness is the target) or indirectly
(in which case the witness and target are distinct – the witness is also
instrumental) (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 236).

6

Duvall and Stohl address how violence committed against a victim actually
instills terror within a witness to that violence. They identify three features of terroristic
violence that must be present in order to produce terror within a witness. The first feature
is that “the witness must perceive him or herself as a potential victim,” and this is
communicated either explicitly or implicitly through “a threat of future or continued
violence” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 236). The second feature is that the witness must
perceive that he or she is a likely victim and/or that the potential violence is extreme in its
ruthlessness (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 236). Duvall and Stohl argue that this feature
“suggests that a well-conceived strategy of terrorism will entail violence that is extreme
and ruthless, creating maximal pain and suffering, or that is sensational in some other
fashion and/or that makes it appear that witnesses are themselves likely victims” (Duvall
and Stohl 1988, 236). The third feature is that the violence must be unpredictable
because of the sporadic and/or indiscriminate manner in which the violence is carried out
(Duvall and Stohl 1988, 237-238). Duvall and Stohl believe that the unpredictability of
the violence is “the primary means through which violence terrorizes witnesses” (Duvall
and Stohl 1988, 238). They find that these features can be used to reveal whether the
state is employing strategies of terrorism. According to Duvall and Stohl, this can be
accomplished by “identifying the planning and utilization of especially dreadful violence
and/or violence which is apt to appear highly unpredictable to the members of identity
groups at which it is directed” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 238).
CTS Theoretical Antecedent
Duvall and Stohl provide an outline of a model to explain under which conditions
state actors, as well as non-state actors, utilize terrorism. It can be understood as an
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“expected utility” model, although they point out that it does not quite meet the required
standards of such a model. Duvall and Stohl note:
That label…generally connotes a more rigorous formulation and analysis
than we are prepared to offer. Rather, our intent is to make use of the
general logic of this type of model in order to develop…the set of broad
preconditions that are apt to underlie the occurrence of terrorist behavior,
both by agents of the state and others (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 254).
According to Duvall and Stohl, an “expected utility” model has as its basis the
assumption that an actor (state or non-state) acts according to a fundamental rule, which
is composed of three elements: (1) the benefits, as defined by the actor, which he or she
would gain from a desired situation; (2) the actor’s expectation about the probability that
the desired situation would be realized if the actor were to carry out a specific action; and
(3) the actor’s expectation about the probable costs he or she would incur as a result of
carrying out that action (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 254). Thus, the fundamental rule of
behavior is that the actor carries out the action in which the efficacy of that action is
expected to be higher than alternative actions (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 254). Applying
this model to the phenomenon of terrorism, Duvall and Stohl conclude: “The greater the
relative expected utility of terrorist action for an actor, the greater is the probability that
the actor will engage in terrorist action” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 254).
When applying the “expected utility” model specifically to state terrorism, Duvall
and Stohl identify two different types of “probable costs” that a state might incur as a
result of engaging in a terrorist action: response costs and production costs. Response
costs are “punitive or retributive costs imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or
offended bystanders” as a reaction to the use of terrorism by the state (Duvall and Stohl
1988, 259). Duvall and Stohl determine that terrorist actions by the state should cause
8

punitive or retributive responses at least as severe as non-terroristic forms of state
repression (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 259-260). Therefore, they argue, states employ
terrorism because it is a “means of invulnerability” to these retaliatory responses because
it is often conducted in secrecy (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 260). Duvall and Stohl
conclude: “State terrorism can often be expected to be covert action, because in this way
the government effectively reduces its vulnerability to retaliation even below its
vulnerability to the (otherwise lesser) response costs expected for other means of
governance” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 260).
Production costs, on the other hand, are the costs “simply of taking the action
regardless of the reactions of others” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 260). Because terrorism is
relatively inexpensive to organize and carry out, they find that “this cost is most
importantly a self-imposed cost” which “takes the form of normative or moral constraint
on action” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 260-261). When applying production costs to an
understanding of state terrorism, Duvall and Stohl identify two syndromes, which if one
or both is present within a country, will reduce the normative or moral constraints on the
use of terrorism by state actors. One is the militaristic-state syndrome, which is
characterized by “a cultural glorification of violence and large and politically important
military/police institutions which are highly bureaucratized and in which the decisional
chain is depersonalized” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 261). The other is the ideologicalmission syndrome, which is characterized by “regime commitment of a zealous,
dogmatic nature, which helps to provide an interpretation of the target groups, with which
the regime is in (actual or perceived potential) conflict, as being essentially inferior
peoples” (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 261-262). According to Duvall and Stohl, these
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syndromes can occur simultaneously within a country, and if they do, normative or moral
constraints (i.e., production costs) on state terrorism are at their lowest (Duvall and Stohl
1988, 262). In sum, the “expected utility” model devised by Duvall and Stohl suggests
that states utilize terrorism under two broad conditions: (1) when terrorism will achieve
state goals with lower production costs than other strategies; and (2) when the response
costs of terrorism will be lower than those of other strategies (Duvall and Stohl 1988,
253-262).
CTS Concepts
Despite the efforts of some terrorism scholars to develop concepts of state
terrorism, other scholars have raised objections to the use of the term “state terrorism” as
an analytical concept. According to CTS scholars Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting
(2010), there are five primary objections to the use of this term that have been asserted in
the broader field of terrorism studies: (1) the state has a legitimate right to use violence,
while non-state actors do not; (2) the state only targets opponents of the state, not random
victims; (3) the state does not publicize its violent acts like non-state actors; (4) no new
analytical concepts are needed because this type of state violence is captured by the
concepts “repression” and “human rights violations”; and (5) state violence is
qualitatively different than non-state terrorism, so studying them both under the same
concept would have little analytical value (Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting 2010, 3-5).
These CTS scholars do not accept these arguments and provide a refutation of each: (1)
if the violence possesses the characteristics of terrorism it must be analyzed as such,
regardless of which actor perpetrates it; (2) state agents often target random victims; (3)
the state does not require publicity for its violence to reach its intended audience; (4)
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analytical consistency requires that all cases which meet the criteria of terrorism be
included; (5) state terrorism is the purest and original form of terrorism because
“terrorism” was originally used to describe violent state consolidation, so studying it can
provide insights into its causes and effects (Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting 2010, 3-5).
Like Duvall and Stohl (1988), CTS scholars have also developed concepts
applicable to the study of state terrorism. Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting concisely
define state terrorism as “the intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their
proxies against individuals and groups who are victimized for the purpose of intimidating
or frightening a broader audience” (Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting 2010, 3). According
to these scholars, the intent of the terrorist act is to use “the communicative power of
violence” to intimidate the audience and influence their behavior in order to achieve
specifically political or politico-economic objectives (Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting
2010, 3). Blakeley also argues that states employ terrorism to meet these types of
objectives, noting the distinction between political and economic goals. She points out
that these objectives “include lending political support to the state” and “may also
involve citizens laboring in the interests of elites” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 15).
States may develop and execute terroristic strategies against their own
populations, as well as foreign populations, as a means to meet these political and
politico-economic objectives. Blakeley finds that states use terrorism against their own
populations as an instrument of governance (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 19). She argues:
“Terrorism is used by states internally and across state boundaries against their own
populations as a means of maintaining order and quelling political opposition” (Blakeley
2010, chap. 1, 19). Blakeley also finds that states employ terrorism in foreign territories
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against populations other than their own as an instrument of foreign policy (Blakeley
2010, chap. 1, 19). She argues: “States also use terrorism externally in pursuit of specific
foreign policy objectives, either by undertaking limited campaigns of terror against
specific individuals or groups…or by engaging in much more generalized campaigns of
terror which are intended to destabilize whole societies” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 19).
Blakeley also argues that state terrorism, as an instrument of governance or
foreign policy, can be divided into two different types: limited and wholesale (Blakeley
2009). Jackson provides a discussion of Blakeley’s concepts of limited and wholesale
state terrorism. Limited state terrorism is characterized by “one-off operations designed
for a specific outcome,” whereas wholesale state terrorism is understood as “when a state
seeks to intimidate an entire society, or another state over an extended period of time”
(Jackson 2010, 230). Limited state terrorism is considered the rarest type, while
wholesale state terrorism is found to be far more common (Jackson 2010, 230).
According to Blakeley, the degree that a state is complicit in these types of terrorism can
also vary significantly, such as when state agents (e.g., members of the armed forces or
secret services) directly engage in terrorism or when states sponsor other actors who
engage in terrorism on their behalf (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 19). She identifies two types
of state sponsorship of terrorism: domestic and external (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 20).
Domestic sponsorship of terrorism usually involves lending “covert support for
paramilitary or vigilante groups, or pro-government extremists involved in acts of
terrorism against the citizens of the state” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 20). External
sponsorship of terrorism might involve “lending ideological support to, providing
financial or military support to, or collaborating or cooperating with, an external terrorist
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organization or state involved in terrorism against individuals or groups within its own or
another population” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 20).
In addition to the costs (e.g., response and production costs) that states take into
consideration when deciding whether to employ terrorism, as identified by Duvall and
Stohl (1988), states must also consider the external support provided to them by other
more powerful states. Jackson points out:
[S]tate terrorism is frequently enabled, at least in part, by the military,
economic and diplomatic support, tacit approval or even simply the
calculated indifference they receive from influential, international
actors….Alternately, it can be enabled by the fact that powerful states can
absorb or deflect any externally imposed costs of employing terrorism
(Jackson 2010, 231).

Jackson also notes that characteristics such as state size or political system have
no constraining effects on the use of terrorism by a state, as “terrorism has been, and
continues to be employed by almost every kind of state” (Jackson 2010, 229). According
to Jackson, this fact allows for the dismissal of the argument that terrorism is a “weapon
of the weak” because “objectively and historically, the powerful have employed terrorism
far more frequently than weak actors” (Jackson 2010, 229). He also argues that this fact
suggests that “each case occurs in a unique context of power capabilities, political
interests, culture, and institutional and agential configurations” (Jackson 2010, 229).
Jackson concludes that this, therefore, “highlights some of the limitations of applying
broad generalizations regarding the nature and causes of state terrorism, and the necessity
of retaining a strong sense of context” (Jackson 2010, 229).
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CTS Methodological Approaches
CTS scholars employ a variety of critical methodological approaches to the study
of (state) terrorism, including ethnography, postcolonialism, feminism, discourse
analysis, visual analysis, critical realism, and historical materialism (Dixit and Stump
2016). Most relevant to this thesis is historical materialism, an approach that evolved out
of Karl Marx’s “materialist conception of history.” Marx’s view of history is
encapsulated in his claim that “the economic structure of society” is “the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness,” and that “the mode of production of material life
conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life” (Marx [1867]
1990, 175, footnote 35). Simply stated, Marx saw the economic sphere as playing a
significant role in shaping the political sphere throughout history. Thus, historical
materialism, as described by Maher and Thomson (2016), can be understood as a Marxist
political economy approach that has as its central feature an “acknowledgement of the
mutual constitution of the political and economic spheres” (Maher and Thomson 2016,
35). They characterize it further as an approach that places emphasis on the analysis of
economic production and the social organization corresponding to it (the “materialist”
aspect), as well as emphasis on the analysis of historical change as a continuing process
(the “historical” aspect) (Maher and Thomson 2016, 34).
Maher and Thomson believe that historical materialism is useful for the study of
terrorism for two primary reasons. First, they find that it provides “a way of
understanding and analyzing the broader political and economic contexts in which
terrorism occurs, including the historically specific dynamics of capitalist development”
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(Maher and Thomson 2016, 35). In this regard, historical materialism allows for an
analysis of a wider range of economic factors and political actions (e.g., terrorism), and
their connections within the specific contexts of neoliberal globalization, than other
approaches (e.g., a Weberian approach that views states and markets as distinct concepts)
(Maher and Thomson 2016, 35). Second, Maher and Thomson find that historical
materialism “provides a broader framework for explaining the structural logics of
capitalist development (through notions such as neoliberal globalisation) and how these
logics link with political violence (such as terrorism)” (Maher and Thomson 2016, 35).
In this regard, historical materialism allows for the examination of both political and
economic motives behind terrorism, rather than merely focusing on its political motives
like most approaches to the study of terrorism (Maher and Thomson 2016, 35).
A central component of historical materialism is class analysis, which analyzes
the social relations of production that form the basis of class relations (Maher and
Thomson 2016, 35). As Marx observed, class relations are the interaction of two broad
classes: (1) the dominant capitalist class (i.e., the bourgeoisie) who are the minority and
owns the means of production; and (2) the dominated working-class (i.e., the proletariat)
who are the majority and who must sell their labor-power to the capitalist class in order to
survive (Maher and Thomson 2016, 35). The accumulation of capital for the capitalist
class is made possible through the extraction of surplus-value from the labor provided by
the working-class in the production of commodities, as well as through the sale of these
commodities, which are endowed with more labor than has been paid for by the capitalist
class (Maher and Thomson 2016, 35). The extraction of surplus-value from the labor of
the working-class by the capitalist class, understood by Marx as exploitation, “produces
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class antagonisms and conflict” and “such antagonisms have been a driving force
underpinning historical development” (Maher and Thomson 2016, 35). Within this
context of class antagonisms, terrorism can be understood, according to Maher and
Thomson, as a specific tactic that is employed “by both bourgeois and proletariat sections
of society in order to oppose or advance certain political and economic configurations”
(Maher and Thomson 2016, 36). Therefore, they conclude, applying a historical
materialist approach to the study of terrorism “requires an examination of class
hierarchies, class antagonisms and broader political and economic inequalities” (Maher
and Thomson 2016, 36).
Within the Marxist tradition, the state is generally viewed both as a political
expression of the social relations of production, and as “a tool of elite domination that
typically serves the interests of the bourgeoisie often at the expense of the proletariat”
(Maher and Thomson 2016, 38). Thus, Maher and Thomson conclude that historical
materialism is a useful approach to the study of state terrorism because it situates “state
terrorism in relation to class frictions and elite concentration of power within and through
the state” (Maher and Thomson 2016, 39). This, then, allows the analyst to “locate the
structural sources of state terror within the broader schema of the historical development
of capitalism, in which terror is used to make available and stabilise particular political
and economic arrangements conducive to capitalist interests” (Maher and Thomson 2016,
39). Blakeley also finds that historical materialism is a useful approach to the study of
state terrorism. She argues that it has greater potential for explaining the state terrorism
of liberal-democratic states than the dominant international relations approaches of neorealism and neo-liberalism. Blakeley claims that “the ahistoricity of neo-realist and neo-
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liberal approaches has enabled scholars to explain state terrorism away as occasional and
unfortunate conduct in the face of significant external threats to the state” (Blakeley
2010, 17). She finds that historical materialism, on the other hand, allows for an analysis
of “much longer periods of history” in which “state terrorism is shown to be a tool that
has been central to the foreign policy practices of such states, acting in the interests of
local and global elites” (Blakeley 2010, 17).
In addition to advancing historical materialism for the study of state terrorism,
Blakeley also suggests utilizing context-specific evidence to identify acts of state
terrorism. She argues that states generally try to conceal their involvement in terrorist
activities, so “drawing concrete conclusions about whether certain acts constitute state
terrorism may not always be possible and instead we might need to make inferences from
other, context-specific evidence” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 20). According to Blakeley,
difficulties in identifying whether certain acts constitute state terrorism is connected to
the problems of agency and motive (Blakeley 2010, chap.1, 20). To resolve these
problems, she provides ways that the specific contexts in which state agents perpetrate
violence can be used to determine the agency and motive behind that violence in order to
ascertain if it constitutes state terrorism. Determining agency can be accomplished by
examining the response of the state after a violent act has been committed by an agent of
that state. As Blakeley points out: “If the state fails to prosecute the individual to the full
extent of the law and fails to compensate the victims, and if the state attempts to excuse
the actions in some way, the state is condoning the actions of that individual. We can
argue, therefore, that the state was complicit” (Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 20-21).
Determining motive can be accomplished by examining the means by which state agents
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carry out the violent acts. Blakeley provides an example concerning the use of
disappearances by Latin American states during the Cold War. She writes:
In Argentina and Chile…it was not uncommon for individuals to be taken
by government agents in broad daylight. This would imply that the
disappearances were as much a part of an attempt by the governments to
intimidate their associates as an effort to remove political opponents
(Blakeley 2010, chap. 1, 22).

CTS Empirical Case Studies
The CTS literature contains many empirical case studies of contemporary state
terrorism by scholars who come from a variety of methodological and disciplinary
backgrounds, including history, sociology, criminology, politics, and international
relations. These case studies examine both limited and wholesale state terrorism, as well
as state terrorism that is used as an instrument of both internal governance and foreign
policy. They also examine varying degrees of state complicity in terrorism, from state
sponsorship of terrorism to direct engagement in terrorist actions by state agents. The
states under investigation also vary in both size and political system.
In his study on state terrorism in the Sudan, Mickler (2010) argues that certain
types of state violence can be characterized as state terrorism if the violent acts meet
specific criteria. He applies this criteria to certain acts of violence committed by the
Sudanese state against its own citizens and concludes these acts do constitute forms of
state terrorism. Murphy and Tamana (2010) explore state terrorism in Pakistan and argue
that the Pakistani military is the primary instrument of terrorism for the Pakistani state.
They determine this through the examination of the historical factors that have
encouraged the military to use terrorism on its own population as well as beyond its
borders. In his study of state terrorism in India’s Gujarat, Murphy (2010) examines the
18

complicity of the state in terrorism directed at Muslims by Hindu mobs. He concludes
that the primary motivation for the state’s participation in the terrorist violence was to
win electoral support for the political party in power. Nasr (2010) provides an evaluation
of Israel’s practices and policies that are applied in the occupation of the Palestinian
Territories to determine if they can be characterized as acts of state terrorism. She
concludes that many of these practices are forms of terrorism and are committed on a
daily basis. Wardrop (2010), in her study of contemporary Zimbabwe, asserts that the
state terrorism being perpetrated in the country can only be understood in the historical
context. She argues that a condition of state terror, which was initially forced on the
indigenous population by the colonial state, is being perpetuated by post-colonial elites as
a means to preserve their positions of power and privilege. Mason (2010) examines acts
of terrorism committed by the Kuwaiti state against its Palestinian population. Mason
finds that terrorism targeting Palestinians was initially perpetrated by Kuwaiti vigilantes
and then later compounded by the state through measures intended to consolidate the
environment of terrorist violence. In his study of state terrorism in Papua New Guinea,
Laslett (2010) identifies and defines the social conditions in which state actors employed
terrorism as a relevant political practice. He concludes that terrorism is used by the state
to create stability for national projects and to present itself as legitimate to clan
communities. Raphael (2010) examines the strategy of violence used by the state and its
paramilitary proxies against civilians in Colombia. He finds that this strategy is primarily
carried out by paramilitary organizations linked to the state with the intent of suppressing
any challenge to the political and economic status quo. Poynting (2010) analyzes the
case of Mamdouh Habib, a victim of US rendition and torture, in order to determine if it
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constitutes an act of state terrorism. By applying the criteria from the definitions of
“international terrorism” and “terrorism” found in US and Australian federal law to this
case, he concludes that it does meet this criteria and should be characterized as an
instance of state terrorism. McCulloch (2010), in his study of the US War on Terror,
argues that this so-called counter-terrorism campaign reflects, extends, and reinforces the
penal punishment and state terror that is prevalent in the criminal justice system of the
US and other Western states. He finds that the War on Terror and the extension of this
system open up new markets from which private capital can profit. In her study of Israeli
actions during the Second Lebanon War, Hamilton (2010) argues that the strategy of
deterrence used by state militaries often relies on terrorism as a means of achieving its
goals. She finds that the deterrence strategy used by Israel against Hezbollah involved
terrorist tactics that inflicted a degree of suffering beyond what is viewed as commonly
acceptable.
As the examples above demonstrate, the CTS literature includes a variety of
empirical case studies that provide descriptive accounts of contemporary state terrorism.
While empirical case studies are useful for understanding the many different contexts in
which state terrorism occurs, they do not provide theories of state terrorism that have
explanatory potential. Jackson recognizes this deficiency and argues: “What are largely
missing are theoretically oriented analyses of the processes, causes, outcomes, and
termination of state terrorism, and the refinement of concepts and analytical tools for its
analysis” (Jackson 2010, 232-233).
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CTS Theory
McKeown (2011) provides a study of state terrorism that addresses the issue
observed by Jackson, namely, that there is an absence of “theoretically oriented analyses”
within the terrorism literature. In response to Jackson and for the purpose of his analysis,
McKeown argues that “we need a theory of social relations; and, more precisely…we
need a Marxist theory of international social relations, because Marxism is rooted in the
study of social conflict” (McKeown 2011, 76). McKeown discusses Blakeley’s
methodological approach to the study of state terrorism and finds that it is primarily
concerned with accomplishing two aims: “First, it tries to identify instances of state
terrorism; and second, it seeks to identify the particular agents who have carried out or
are implicit in that terrorism to ascertain whether they were working on behalf of any
particular state” (McKeown 2016, 75). McKeown believes that while Blakeley’s
historical materialist approach, which situates these instances of state terrorism within
relations of capitalist imperialism, is more nuanced than other approaches within CTS, it
still focuses primarily on policies of state terrorism (McKeown 2016, 76). His approach,
which he views as complementary to Blakeley’s, “maintains that what is most crucial for
any understanding of the relationship between state violence and broader politicaleconomic structures is the question of ‘what the world must be like for acts of state
terrorism to be possible’” (McKeown 2011, 76). This question, then, according to
McKeown, “demands a theoretical way of understanding what it is that causes acts of
state terrorism in the first place” (McKeown 2011, 76). With a focus on theoretical
development, McKeown provides an analysis of the structural causes of state terrorism.
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McKeown constructs his theory within a framework of capitalist imperialism. He
argues that “capitalist imperialism is a root cause of state terrorism in the developing
world” and that “state terrorism is produced by the dynamic of imperialism through
relations of structural inequality that are expressed and propagated through international
law (IL)” (McKeown 2011, 76). According to McKeown, leading capitalist states spread
IL in developing states through “democracy promotion” or “good governance” with the
intention of preventing these states from adopting any independent forms of development
(McKeown 2016, 76). The ultimate objective of the leading capitalist states is
“incorporating [developing] states into the circuits of global capital through a
fundamental deepening of the logic of the capital relation and of capitalist exchange
relations [CER]” (McKeown 2016, 78). He argues that the IL mechanisms used to
deepen and expand these relations include both bilateral and multilateral treaties, which
embody unequal political and economic relations between the states involved (McKeown
2016, 78). As McKeown further argues:
In these formally equal agreements, substantive inequality is buttressed
through the dominant countries’ monopoly of high technology, strength in
world financial markets, control of the world’s natural resources and of the
channels of media and communications; and…by the ultimate form of
state terrorism: a monopoly over the weapons of mass destruction
(McKeown 2016, 78).

IL expressed through these treaties, thereby, constrains the policy options of developing
states on issues such as monetary policy, and trade and productive relations (McKeown
2016, 78).
In a more overt manner, according to McKeown, the dominant states impose a
neoliberal paradigm on the developing states through IL (McKeown 2016, 78). This
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neoliberal paradigm includes policies such as structural adjustment programs and
conditionality agreements, which “force indebted states, in exchange for help with
balance-of-payments problems, to reconfigure the very means of social reproduction”
(McKeown 2016, 78). McKeown argues that the neoliberal paradigm consists of four
general policies that tend to exacerbate class conflict, and to produce or exacerbate acts
of state terrorism: (1) deregulation; (2) privatization and commodification; (3)
liberalization of trade and finance; and (4) decentralization (McKeown 2016, 78). These
general policies initiate distinct processes in two respective areas within a country: (1)
areas where CERs are dominant; and (2) areas where CERs are not dominant (McKeown
2016, 79). In the first area, the process of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey
2003; 2005) occurs as the state engages in policies of recommodification and
restructuring (McKeown 2016, 79). Accumulation by dispossession, according to
McKeown, involves “attempts to reconfigure commodity relations in ways which
structurally favour imperialist interests” (McKeown 2016, 79-80). In the second area, the
process of “primitive accumulation” (Marx [1867] 1990) occurs as the state engages in
policies of commodification of land, individualization of property rights, land tilting, and
the creation of land banks (McKeown 2016, 79). Primitive accumulation, according to
McKeown, “denotes the ‘historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production’ on terms conducive to the development of the capitalist forces of production”
(McKeown 2016, 79). Both of these processes, accumulation by dispossession and
primitive accumulation, result in outcomes that, according to McKeown, can be
expressed as two counter-tendencies: (1) the (re)commodification, centralization, and
concentration of land, capital, and means of production; and (2) resistance to the
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(re)commodification, centralization, and concentration of land, capital, and means of
production (McKeown 2016, 79). He concludes: “Together, these counter-tendencies
produce class conflict. In areas where the State’s capacity prevents it achieving its
objectives through ideological or repressive means (either legal or illegal), state terrorism
is deployed as a mechanism of governance” (McKeown 2016, 79). McKeown
empirically demonstrates the process of accumulation by dispossession in the case of
Colombia and the process of primitive accumulation in the case of Brazil.
Toward a Theory of Class Structure and State Terrorism
This study draws upon the CTS literature, as well as the work of Duvall and
Stohl, to determine how class structure impacts the degree of state terrorism within a
particular country. In this regard, the study focuses on the class structure found within a
nation-state and the terrorism used by states as an instrument of internal governance
within their national territory. It utilizes the critical methodological approach of
historical materialism, which includes Marxist class analysis, and develops a theory of
class structure and state terrorism that is generalizable to the national class structure of a
wide variety of capitalist states (i.e, different sizes and political systems) and different
epochs of capitalist expansion. In order to provide a sense of agency to the state, this
study relies on the “expected utility” model developed by Duvall and Stohl (1988). In
identifying instances of state terrorism, this study utilizes Blakeley’s (2010, chap. 1)
approach of determining the agency and motive of state agents and other supporting
actors through the analysis of context-specific evidence. In addition, other definitions
and concepts found in the literature review concerning state terrorism are utilized
throughout this study.
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II. THEORY, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA
Concepts of Marxist Class Analysis
Marxist class analysis is useful for the examination of the relationship between
class structure and state terrorism because it focuses on social conflict. As Wright (2005)
points out, Marxist class analysis “foregrounds conflict within class relations” and
“understands conflict as generated by inherent properties of those relations rather than
contingent factors” (Wright 2005, 28). Because of state terrorism’s inherently conflictual
nature, the concepts of Marxist class analysis serve as an appropriate basis for the
construction of a theory of this particular phenomenon. This study utilizes a model of
Marxist class analysis that is based on Wright’s interpretation of Marxist concepts
pertaining to class. He notes that “among writers who identify with Marxism there is no
consensus on any of the core concepts of class analysis” (Wright 2005, 5). Rather,
according to Wright, the Marxist tradition is defined by more of “a loose commitment to
the importance of class analysis for understanding the conditions for challenging
capitalist oppressions and the language within which debates are waged…than a precise
set of definitions and propositions” (Wright 2005, 5). Thus, this study relies on a model
of Marxist class analysis that reflects Wright’s “specific stance within that tradition”
(Wright 2005, 5). Because this model of analysis is based on Wright’s interpretation of
Marxist concepts, further elaboration of these concepts and how they relate to one
another is required.
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The first set of concepts of Marxist class analysis, as defined by Wright, can be
characterized as being largely structural in nature (Wright 2005, 20). The concept of
class structure can be understood as “[t]he sum total of the class relations in a given unit
of analysis” (Wright 2005, 19). The nation-state is usually the preferred unit of analysis
among scholars when defining class structure (Wright 2005, 19), and this study adheres
to this convention by developing a theory that is generalizable to different national class
structures. The concept of class relations can be defined as social relations in which “the
rights and powers of people over productive resources are unequally distributed – when
some people have greater rights/powers with specific kinds of productive resources than
do others” (Wright 2005, 10). In this context, rights and powers are always used in
conjunction with one another. Powers are defined as control over the use and disposition
of productive resources, whereas the addition of rights qualifies these powers as being
considered legitimate and enforced by the state (Wright 2005, 9). In order for particular
social relations to be considered as class relations, there must be unequal rights and
powers over “the possession of a resource” as well as “the appropriation of the results of
the use of that resource,” which “implies appropriating income generated by the
deployment of the resource in question” (Wright 2005, 10). In addition: “The sum total
of these rights and powers constitutes the ‘social relations of production,’” and class
relations can be viewed as a form of these social relations of production (Wright 2005,
10). The concept of class locations can be understood as “the social positions occupied
by individuals within a particular kind of social relation, class relations, not simply an
atomized attribute of the person” (Wright 2005, 14). Furthermore: “In capitalism the
central class relation is the capital/labor relation and this determines two class locations,
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capitalists and workers” (Wright 2005, 15). However, the two-location model of
capitalists and workers can be inadequate in its explanatory potential (Wright 2005, 15).
This inadequacy can be resolved by adding additional class locations. As Wright notes,
“The number of such [class] locations within an analysis of class structure…depends
upon how fine-grained an account is needed for the purposes at hand” (Wright 2005, 19).
The second set of concepts of Marxist class analysis, as defined by Wright, can be
characterized as pertaining largely to the agency of class (Wright 2005, 20). The concept
of class interests can be understood as “the material interests of people derived from their
location-within-class relations” (Wright 2005, 20). Material interests that are
characterized as specifically “class” interests means that “the opportunities and trade-offs
people face in pursuing these interests are structured by their class locations” (Wright
2005, 20-21). The concept of class struggle can be understood as “conflicts between the
practices of individuals and collectivities in pursuit of opposing class interests” (Wright
2005, 21). These conflicts include attempts by individual workers to reduce their own
effort in the labor process, as well as the struggle “between highly organized collectivities
of workers and capitalists over the distribution of rights and powers within production”
(Wright 2005, 21).
Class-Location Model
This study uses a simple six-location model that is potentially generalizable to
the class locations of the national class structures of a wide variety of capitalist states
(e.g., different sizes and political systems) and different epochs of capitalist expansion.
The wide applicability of the model allows for a comparison of the national class
structures of different capitalist states in order to identify similarities and differences in
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the class relations that combine to form these structures. Class locations include: (1)
capitalists; (2) middle-class managers, professionals, and small entrepreneurs; (3) urban
workers; (4) rural workers; (5) peasants; and (6) state authorities and state agents.
Capitalists are those who derive remuneration from ownership of or investment in
medium- and large-scale means of production. They include capitalists involved in both
urban production (e.g., manufacturing) and rural production (e.g., agriculture). Middleclass professionals, managers, and small entrepreneurs are those who generally possess
more formal education and/or capital than workers and peasants. They have shared class
interests with capitalists. Urban workers are those who sell their labor-power (in
exchange for remuneration) to capitalists involved in urban production, and in this way,
they are incorporated into the regulated capitalist economy. Rural workers are those who
sell their labor-power (in exchange for remuneration) to capitalists involved in rural
production, and in this way, they are incorporated into the regulated capitalist economy.
Peasants are not fully incorporated into the regulated capitalist economy. They are
primarily involved in unregulated labor (e.g., direct-subsistence agriculture) but may
derive some remuneration from involvement in the regulated capitalist economy. Urban
workers, rural workers, and peasants have shared class interests. State authorities and
state agents are not necessarily a distinct socio-economic class (high-level state
authorities may be capitalists while low-level state agents may be middle-class), but both
share a common interest in pursuing state interests, which are primarily the class interests
of capitalists. State authorities include government leaders and state bureaucrats, and
state agents include members of the police and armed forces.
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Marxist Conception of the Capitalist State
To understand the relationship between class structure and state terrorism, one
must first understand how the dominant capitalist class exercises its power politically in
order to maintain its dominance. As Robinson (2004) argues: “An account of the power
of the capitalist ruling class must take into account the state and the political process”
(Robinson 2004, 87). To begin, the power of the dominant capitalist class resides in its
ability to command production and accumulate wealth. As Robinson points out: “The
social power of groups is grounded in control over wealth (the means of production and
the social product)” (Robinson 2004, 87). However, this control over production and the
wealth it generates is “always exercised through institutions,” such that “a dominant class
exercises its rule through political institutions” (Robinson 2004, 87). Thus, according to
Robinson, the state can be conceptualized as “the congealment of a particular historically
determined constellation of class forces and relations, and states are always embodied in
sets of political institutions” (Robinson 2004, 99). In this regard, the state consists of two
dimensions. First, it is a moment of class (power) relations, and second, it is a set of
political institutions, or an apparatus (Robinson 2004, 99). Concerning these two
dimensions, Robinson argues: “The state is not one or the other; it is both in their unity”
(Robinson 2004, 99). This conceptualization of the state is in line with historical
materialism, which views the economic sphere and the political sphere as having an
internal relation: “one in which each part is constituted in its relation to the other, so that
one cannot exist without the other and only has meaning when seen within the relation”
(Robinson 2004, 96). This relation is in contrast to an external relation: “one in which
each part has an existence independent of its relation to the other” (Robinson 2004, 96).
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Therefore, according to Robinson, the economic sphere and the political sphere can be
understood as “distinct moments of the same totality” in which “the relation between the
economy, or social production relations under capitalism, and states as sets of
institutionalized class relations that adhere to those production relations” can be
characterized as an internal relation (Robinson 2004, 96).
Within the Marxist tradition, there exist two perspectives on how the state
represents the dominant classes and groups within society. The first is the instrumentalist
perspective, which views representatives of the dominant classes and groups as directly
“instrumentalizing” the state “in order to shape policies in their interests” (Robinson
2004, 97). The second is the structuralist perspective, which views “the very structure of
capitalist society” as forcing “the state to implement policies” that advance the interests
of the dominant classes and groups (Robinson 2004, 97). While these perspectives differ
on their view of how the state represents the dominant classes and groups, they generally
agree that “the state, far from being a neutral arena, is an institution that defends the
interests of groups that are dominant in the economy and society” (Robinson 2004, 9697). In addition to this point of agreement, neither the instrumentalist nor the structuralist
perspective “posit an independent state as a separate sphere with its own logic,” but
rather, both agree that “the state is internally related to society, to the social forces and
structures that make up society” (Robinson 2004, 97). In this regard, it can be understood
that there exists a “complex of social processes and relations that embed states in the
configuration of civil society and political economy” (Robinson 2004, 97).
Within the Marxist tradition, the state is viewed as being rooted in civil society.
Civil society can be understood as “the diverse sets of nonstate institutions that make up
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society, ranging from the church to news media, social clubs, professional associations,
and private businesses – everything between the state and the family” (Robinson 2004,
97). One of the core features of civil society is that the population is divided into distinct,
internally-related classes (Robinson 2004, 97). This internal relation of classes, or class
(power) relations, gives a particular form to the state, such that “states as coercive
systems of authority are class relations and social practices congealed and operationalized
through political institutions” (Robinson 2004, 97-98). Thus, the state is the political
form of the unequal social relations of economic life, in that “states spring from
economic (production) relations and represent the institutionalization of social relations
of domination” (Robinson 2004, 98). State apparatuses, then, can be understood as
“those instruments that enforce and reproduce the class and social group relations and
practices embedded in states” (Robinson 2004, 98).
Capitalist-State Model
This study uses a model of the capitalist state based on the structuralist
perspective. A central concept of this perspective is the “relative autonomy of the state”
(Poulantzas [1968] 1978). According to Robinson, this concept is predicated on the
understanding that “the state may act with an autonomy relative to different groups in
society” (Robinson 2004, 97). While it can be understood that the state is “an instrument
that serves the interests of particular groups and classes, there is not necessarily any
direct manipulation of the state in the fulfillment of these interests” (Robinson 2004, 97).
In relation to the concept of the relative autonomy of the state, this model relies on two
defining features of the capitalist state put forth by Poulantzas ([1968] 1978). First, the
state represents the political interests of the dominant classes as a whole, not the specific
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interests of individual capitalists. As Poulantzas argues: “The capitalist state,
characterized by hegemonic class leadership, does not directly represent the dominant
classes’ economic interests, but their political interests: it is the dominant classes’
political power centre, as the organizing agent of their political struggle” (Poulantzas
[1968] 1978, 190). Second, the state acts to prevent the dominated classes from
organizing politically in order to change the economic status quo. As Poulantzas claims:
“With regard to the dominated classes, the function of the capitalist state is to prevent
their political organization which would overcome their economic isolation: it does this
by maintaining them in this isolation which is partly its own effect” (Poulantzas [1968]
1978, 188).
In order to provide a sense of agency to the state with regard to its use of
terrorism, this model of the capitalist state relies on Duvall and Stohl’s (1988) “expected
utility” model. Based on this model, it can be understood that the state utilizes terrorism
under two broad conditions: (1) when terrorism will achieve state goals with lower
production costs than other strategies; and (2) when the response costs of terrorism will
be lower than those of other strategies (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 253-262). An important
caveat that must be recognized concerning the use of the “expected utility” model in this
model of the capitalist state is that the state itself is not an actor, but rather, “[s]ocial
classes and groups are historical actors” (Robinson 2004, 98). To think of the state as an
actor is to engage in reification, or “to attribute a thinglike status to what should be more
properly seen as a complex, changing set of social relations that [social] practice has
created” (Robinson 2004, 90-91). So, while this study uses the concept of the capitalist
state in its analysis, it is ultimately understood that “[s]ocial classes acting in and out of
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states (and other institutions) do things as collective historical agents” (Robinson 2004,
98).
Marxist Theory of Exploitation and Domination
This study relies on Wright’s (2005) interpretation of the Marxist theory of
exploitation and domination as the basis of its theory of class structure and state
terrorism. Marxist theory views the fundamental structure of capitalism as being
constituted by class relations that are inherently conflictual in that they “generate
antagonisms of interests that underlie overt conflicts” (Wright 2005, 12). The primary
causal mechanism within class relations that generates these antagonisms is exploitation.
This concept is used to describe “a particular form of interdependence of the material
interests of people” (Wright 2005, 22). This interdependence is characterized by three
features. First, “[t]he material welfare of exploiters causally depends upon the material
deprivations of the exploited” (Wright 2005, 23). Second, the material welfare of
exploiters “depends upon the exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive
resources” (Wright 2005, 23). Third, the exclusion of the exploited from productive
resources “generates material advantage to exploiters because it enables them to
appropriate the labor effort of the exploited” (Wright 2005, 23). This relationship
between exploiters (i.e., capitalists) and exploited (i.e., workers) is maintained because of
the rights and powers held by exploiters that give them greater control over productive
resources. These disparities in control over resources and the concomitant disparities in
labor effort and income increases the likelihood of conflict between capitalists and
workers.
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Despite lacking control over productive resources, the exploited have a unique
power within the production process that allows them to resist the economic oppression
of exploiters. This is because of the interdependent nature of the relationship between
exploiter and exploited in which “the exploiters actively need the exploited: exploiters
depend upon the effort of the exploited for their own welfare” (Wright 2005, 24).
Because of this, exploiters must develop strategies that allow them to dominate the
exploited within the production process in order to prevent resistance and continue the
appropriation of labor effort from the exploited. The concept of domination can be
understood as “the social relations within which one person’s activities are directed and
controlled by another” (Wright 2005, 25). Initially, domination is established in
connection with the second feature of interdependence in which the exploited are
excluded from access to productive resources. This is accomplished through the
establishment of state-enforced rights and powers over productive resources, which are
held by exploiters but denied to the exploited. Domination, however, is more commonly
associated with the third feature of interdependence in which the labor effort of the
exploited is appropriated for the material advantage of the exploiters. This is because
“the appropriation of the labor effort of the exploited usually requires direct forms of
subordination, especially within the labor process, in the form of bossing, surveillance,
threats, etc.” (Wright 2005, 25). In Marxist theory, exploitation and domination are
viewed as the fundamental characteristics of the structural interdependence between
exploiters and exploited within class relations (Wright 2005, 25).
The following theory of class structure and state terrorism builds on the Marxist
theory of exploitation and domination and provides a theory that is generalizable to the
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national class structure of a wide variety of capitalist states (e.g., different sizes and
political systems) and different epochs of capitalist expansion.
Theory of Class Structure and State Terrorism in Capitalist States
The class relations (the total of which constitute the national class structure)
between capitalists and workers within the capitalist state are structured so that capitalists
possess greater rights and powers over the use and disposition of productive resources
than workers. By excluding workers from productive resources through the power of the
state, capitalists gain a material advantage enabling them to appropriate the labor effort
of workers within the regulated capitalist economy. This material advantage, which is
translated into political power and influence over the state’s political institutions, and by
extension, the state’s repressive apparatus and its proxies, also enables them to
expropriate, through the processes of primitive accumulation and accumulation by
dispossession, the productive resources of peasants (e.g., land and all it contains), which
are situated outside of the regulated capitalist economy.1 High levels of socio-economic
inequalities that are inherent to the exploitative nature of the structured interactions
between capitalists and workers and/or peasants produces a desire for change in these
inequalities among workers and/or peasants. As rising political leaders indicate a
willingness to address socio-economic inequalities, they contribute to the formation of
high expectations of change in these inequalities within the minds of workers and/or
peasants. If these political leaders eventually attain power and their initiatives to address
socio-economic inequalities do not produce a noticeable decrease in these inequalities,
they fail the expectations of workers and/or peasants. The failed expectations of workers

1. This study does not examine state expropriation of peasant lands through the processes of primitive
accumulation and accumulation by dispossession but leaves it open for future research.
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and/or peasants may lead them to engage in class struggle in the form of labor conflict
within social relations of production (e.g., strikes) or, to engage in class struggle in its
most extreme form, armed conflict outside of social relations of production (e.g.,
insurgency). Because the strategies and institutional devices of domination within the
labor process (e.g., bossing, surveillance, threats, etc.) failed to contain and suppress
outbreaks of labor insubordination, the state, acting on behalf of the interests of
capitalists as a whole, utilizes terrorism as a means of domination outside of the labor
process, targeting activist workers and/or peasants, and in some instances, extending this
violence to the wider society. The intent behind the state’s use of terrorism is to
intimidate activist workers and/or peasants and discourage future ones, as well as to
intimidate potential allies within the other classes, thereby preserving the economic status
quo (i.e., the unaltered and uninterrupted appropriation of the labor effort of workers by
capitalists and capitalist control over key productive resources). This theory can be
reduced to the fundamental (potentially) causal relationship between three broad
concepts:
Exploitation → Class Struggle → Domination
Terrorism is one form of domination, external to the labor process, that the state has at its
disposal to address outbreaks of labor insubordination that occur outside of the labor
process (other forms range from direct police repression to direct military violence).
Hence, the state will not always use terrorism to achieve its goals but is likely to utilize
terrorist violence under two broad conditions: (1) when terrorism will achieve state goals
with lower production costs than other strategies; and (2) when the response costs of
terrorism will be lower than those of other strategies (Duvall and Stohl 1988, 253-262).
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Methodology and Research Design
In order to provide empirical evidence for the proposed theory of class structure
and state terrorism, this qualitative study utilizes the comparative method with a most
different systems design to examine two cases of capitalist states. It takes as its starting
point and organizational basis the fundamental (potentially) causal relationship between
the three broad multidimensional concepts: (1) exploitation; (2) class struggle; and (3)
domination (in its specific form of state terrorism). In this relationship, exploitation is the
independent concept, class struggle is the intervening concept, and domination is the
dependent concept. Each of these three concepts is divided into its constituent
dimensions, and each dimension is given a variable to represent it. The relationship of
these variables is then examined in each case study through an analytical narrative that
relies on both primary and secondary sources. Following this, a comparison of the two
case studies is made to determine which of the independent variables in each case is
likely the main driver (through the intervening variables) of the dependent variables.
Each of the three broad multidimensional concepts and their variables and corresponding
data sources are discussed below.
Exploitation: Variables and Data Sources
If one accepts the claim of Marxist theory that the capitalist mode of production is
based on exploitation (which is inherent to the class relations that constitute the class
structure) because the labor effort of workers is appropriated by capitalists, then all
varieties of capitalism can be viewed as inherently exploitative. The level of exploitation
in each national class structure just becomes a matter of degree. Those national class
structures in which workers have a low degree of rights and powers over the use and
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disposition of productive resources can be understood as being more exploitative than
those national class structures in which workers have a high degree of rights and powers
over the use and disposition of productive resources. Therefore, exploitation as a
multidimensional concept can be broken down into the following dimensions concerning
the rights and powers of workers over the use and disposition of productive resources: (1)
the unequal appropriation of the income generated by the use of productive resources; (2)
the unequal capacity of workers to determine the appropriation of income generated by
the use of productive resources (3) the unequal possession of productive resources. Each
of these three dimensions is given a more specific concept that can be more easily
measured: (1) the income inequality concept represents the unequal appropriation of the
income generated by the use of productive resources; (2) the unequal collective labor
rights concept represents the unequal capacity of workers to determine the appropriation
of income generated by productive resources; and (3) the land inequality concept
represents the unequal possession of productive resources. Each of these three concepts
is given a variable that is representative of it: (1) the disposable income inequality
variable represents income inequality; (2) the violations of collective labor rights variable
represents unequal collective labor rights; and (3) the land inequality variable represents
land inequality.
The disposable income inequality variable is measured with a Gini coefficient,
which indicates the level of disposable income inequality within a particular country for a
particular year. Higher values indicate greater inequality in disposable income. The data
for this variable is found in “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database,
Version 8” (Solt 2019). The violations of collective labor rights variable is measured
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with a score based on the weighting and tallying of a total of thirty-seven types of labor
violations concerning six broad categories of collective labor rights: (1) freedom of
association and collective bargaining‐related liberties; (2) the right to establish and join
worker and union organizations; (3) other union activities; (4) the right to bargain
collectively; (5) the right to strike; and (6) rights in export processing zones. The score
(specifically “LaborRightsNeg”) indicates violations of overall collective labor rights
within a particular country for a particular year. Higher values indicate greater violations
of overall collective labor rights. The data for this variable is found in “The Collective
Labor Rights Dataset” (Mosley 2011). The land inequality variable is measured with a
Gini coefficient, which indicates the level of land inequality within a particular country
for a particular year. Higher values indicate greater inequality in land ownership. The
data for this variable is found in “Inequality and Human Rights: Who Controls What,
When, and How” (Landman and Larizza 2018).
Class Struggle: Variables and Data Sources
Class struggle broadly defined is “conflicts between the practices of individuals
and collectivities in pursuit of opposing class interests” (Wright 2005, 21). This study
focuses solely on worker/peasant-initiated class struggle that is in pursuit of their class
interests. As a multidimensional concept, class struggle can be broken down into the
following dimensions/concepts: (1) labor conflict, which is defined as class struggle
within social relations of production (e.g., strikes); and (2) armed conflict, which is
defined as class struggle outside of social relations of production (e.g., insurgency). Each
of these dimensions/concepts is given a variable that is representative of it: (1) the labor
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conflict variable represents labor conflict; and (2) the armed conflict variable represents
armed conflict.
The labor conflict variable is measured by the total number of strikes and lockouts
in all occupational sectors within a particular country for a particular year. A measure of
the total number of strikes and/or lockouts in the rural occupational sector of agriculture,
forestry, and fishing within a particular country for a particular year is also included
when a more fine-grained analysis is required. While lockouts are employer-initiated
actions against workers, they are generally initiated in response to worker-initiated class
struggle, and therefore, can be understood as a component of worker-initiated class
struggle. The data for this variable is found in “Strikes_ILO_1927-2008” (van der
Velden 2018). The armed conflict variable is measured by whether armed insurgency is
present within a particular country for a particular year. This is determined through the
analysis of primary and secondary sources.
Domination: Variables and Data Sources
Domination broadly defined is “the social relations within which one person’s
activities are directed and controlled by another” (Wright 2005, 25). This study focuses
solely on domination in its specific form as state terrorism. State terrorism as a concept
is defined as “the intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their proxies
against individuals and groups who are victimized for the purpose of intimidating or
frightening a broader audience….The intended effects of the violence are the
achievement of specific political or political-economic…goals” (Jackson, Murphy, and
Poynting 2010, 3). This study focuses solely on state terrorism that is used against a
state’s own citizenry as an instrument of internal governance. As a multidimensional
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concept, state terrorism can be broken down into the following dimensions/concepts: (1)
political terror, which is defined as the overall “violations of basic human rights to the
physical integrity of the person by agents of the state in question” (Gibney et al. 2019);
(2) government violations of its citizens’ human rights through disappearances; (3)
government violations of its citizens’ human rights through extrajudicial killings; (4)
government violations of its citizens’ human rights through political imprisonment; and
(5) government violations of its citizens’ human rights through torture. Each of these
dimensions/concepts is given a variable that is representative of it: (1) the political terror
variable represents political terror; (2) the disappearances variable represents government
violations of its citizens’ human rights through disappearances; (3) the extrajudicial
killings variable represents government violations of its citizens’ human rights through
extrajudicial killings; (4) the political imprisonment variable represents government
violations of its citizens’ human rights through political imprisonment; and (5) the torture
variable represents government violations of its citizens’ human rights through torture.
The political terror variable is measured on a 5-point ordinal scale called the
Political Terror Scale (PTS), which indicates the level of political terror within a
particular country for a particular year. Higher values indicate greater levels of political
terror. This study relies solely on the “PTS: Amnesty International” scale, which is based
on information contained in Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports. The
data for this variable is found in “The Political Terror Scale” (Gibney et al. 2019). The
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture variables are
each measured with a 3-level scale, which indicates the frequency level at which the
government violated the human rights of its citizens within a particular country for a
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particular year. Frequency levels include: (1) frequently; (2) occasionally; and (3) not at
all. The data for this variable is found in “The CIRI Human Rights Dataset” (Cingarelli,
Richards, and Clay 2014). While political terror and the government human rights
violations of disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture are
indicative of state terrorism, they are not synonymous with it. In order to determine if the
state violence in each case specifically constitutes state terrorism, this study utilizes
Blakeley’s (2010, chap. 1) approach of determining the agency and motive of state agents
and other supporting actors through the analysis of context-specific evidence contained in
Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports for the relevant years.
Hypotheses
This study proposes three hypotheses in accordance with the proposed theory of
class structure and state terrorism.
Hypothesis One: After government initiatives to address income inequality lead
to little decrease in income inequality, the failed expectations of workers and peasants is
likely to lead to an increase in labor conflict and/or armed conflict, and this is likely to
lead to an increase in state terrorism.
Hypothesis Two: After government initiatives to address unequal collective labor
rights lead to little decrease in unequal collective labor rights, the failed expectations of
workers and peasants is likely to lead to an increase in labor conflict and/or armed
conflict, and this is likely to lead to an increase in state terrorism.
Hypothesis Three: After government initiatives to address land inequality lead to
little decrease in land inequality, the failed expectations of workers and peasants is likely
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to lead to an increase in labor conflict and/or armed conflict, and this is likely to lead to
an increase in state terrorism.
Case Structure and Case Selection
This qualitative study examines two cases of capitalist states in order to provide
empirical evidence for the proposed theory of class structure and state terrorism. These
capitalist states include Brazil and the Philippines during a period of time in which each
was experiencing a national regime transition after a long history of authoritarian rule.
The case of Brazil includes the six-year period from 1985 through 1990, often referred to
as the New Republic, which spanned the presidential term of Jose Sarney, the first
civilian president after the dissolution of the twenty-one-year military dictatorship. The
case of the Philippines includes the seven year-period from 1986 through 1992, which
spanned the presidential term of Corazon Aquino, the first president after the People
Power Revolution drove Ferdinand Marcos from his twenty years of authoritarian rule.
During the authoritarian periods of each country, prior to their respective national regime
transitions, the state consistently used terrorism against its own citizens as an instrument
of internal governance against a backdrop of socio-economic inequalities, such as income
inequality, unequal collective labor rights, and land inequality.
Brazil and the Philippines were selected as cases because as each country
emerged from authoritarianism, there were general expectations among the population
that socio-economic conditions would improve after the transition to a new regime.
Socio-economic inequalities, however, persisted in both countries, and the state
continued to employ terrorism against its own citizenry. These shared characteristics
between the two countries suggest empirical evidence for the proposed theory. Yet the
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two countries possess regional and cultural differences allowing for the use of the
comparative method with a most different systems design to determine which dimension
of exploitation is the most prominent socio-economic inequality shared by each, and
therefore, potentially the main driver of state terrorism. Each country also shows
variability in its level of political terror, according to the Political Terror Scale, which
allows for a determination of the factors potentially causing this change.
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III. THE CASE OF BRAZIL (1985-1990)
Authoritarian Period
Prior to 1985, Brazil was under military rule for twenty-one years. A military
dictatorship was installed after a coup in 1964, when the Brazilian military overthrew the
constitutional government of President Joao Goulart. The coup was supported by both
right-wing authoritarian military leaders and conservative elites, such as large
landholders and national and multinational business leaders (Napolitano 2018, 2-3).
These military and civilian elites embraced an authoritarian and exclusionary political
culture that had existed since the establishment of the republic in 1889, and this culture
was a contributing factor in the initiation of the coup (Napolitano 2018, 1). The United
States also provided substantial support for the coup, including the positioning of an
aircraft carrier and destroyers in Brazilian coastal waters to deter any opposition (Blum
1995, 167-168). After the coup, the military sought to consolidate the new regime and to
neutralize any potential opposition. It initiated “Operation Cleanup” in which an
estimated 10,000 to 50,000 people deemed to be “subversives” were apprehended
throughout Brazil, with some subjected to various forms of torture (Skidmore 1989, 2324). The military also suspended the political rights and/or revoked the electoral
mandates of 441 Brazilian political figures considered to be “enemies” (Skidmore 1989,
25). The US government also took measures to consolidate the new regime. To
strengthen the regime’s repressive apparatus, the US Office of Public Safety (OPS)
helped to establish a national police force in Brazil by providing arms, training,
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equipment, and ideological indoctrination on the “communist menace” and the necessity
of combatting it (Blum 1995, 171). By 1969, the OPS had instructed over 100,000
Brazilian police officers in Brazilian academies and given additional advanced training to
523 within US institutions (Blum 1995, 171).
Military rule consisted of a succession of governments, always with a four-star
general holding the title of president, surrounded by a coalition of military officers,
technocrats, and conservative politicians (Skidmore 2010, 337). They maintained their
grip on the state by changing procedural rules whenever any opposition within the
government posed a threat to their control (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010, 337). The
wider population, however, was controlled through repression and terrorism. Certain
military officers became convinced that a more direct approach was required to contain
the “subversives” (Skidmore 1989, 127). This approach was first implemented in Sao
Paulo in 1969, with the creation of OBAN (Operation Bandeirante), which united
military personnel and civilian police officers in the responsibility of maintaining Brazil’s
internal security (Skidmore 1989, 128). Originally financed by prominent Sao Paulo
businessmen, the OBAN program evolved into the DOI-CODI (Department of
Information Operations - Center for Internal Defense Operations), with units dispersed
throughout the country and contributions of cash and equipment flowing in from national
and multinational firms (Skidmore 1989, 127). Its modus operandi consisted of
abducting the regime’s political opponents, interrogating them through torture, and in
some instances, killing them extrajudicially (Napolitano 2018, 6). Torture, as a form of
terrorism, became a powerful instrument of social control for the military regime because
it deterred other Brazilians contemplating opposition to the regime, as news of its use was

46

spread by its victims (Skidmore 1989, 89). Politicians and businessmen also relied on
“death squads,” or teams of assassins composed of primarily off-duty police officers, to
execute their political and commercial enemies in exchange for pay (Huggins 1996, 211).
The military also employed them to carry out terrorist operations (e.g., bombings),
allowing the state to maintain an appearance of legality because the “death squads” could
be described as acting independently (Petras 1987, 333). The harshest repression was
usually reserved for those who attempted to organize the working classes, such as Church
groups, labor and peasant unions, and organizers in shantytowns (Skidmore 1989, 180181).
Under military rule from 1964 until 1985, the Brazilian state ultimately murdered
or disappeared an estimated 475 political adversaries, including workers, students, and
militants (Serbin 2019, 1). Over 50,000 Brazilian citizens were imprisoned and more
than 20,000 were subjected to torture2 (Schneider 2014, 72). Often overlooked in the
literature on the military dictatorship is the genocide of an estimated 8,000 indigenous
people because of state violence used in pursuit of state development goals, such as the
construction of highways and hydroelectric plants, and the depopulation of land for
agribusiness3 (Demetrio and Kozicki 2017, 134). At the hands of both state agents and
private gunmen, indigenous groups suffered targeted killings, torture, imprisonment,
forced labor, and coerced removal from their territories (Demetrio and Kozicki 2017,
134).

2. In 1986, a team of researchers sponsored by Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, archbishop of Sao Paulo, and
supported by the World Council of Churches, published the investigative report, Brasil: Nunca Mais. The
report concluded that judicial authorities knew that torture was used to extract confessions and that torture
was an essential component of the military justice system (United States Institute of Peace 2021).
3. The state violence used against indigenous groups in these instances suggests processes of primitive
accumulation for future research.

47

Despite a six-year period of rapid economic expansion in Brazil described by
many observers as an economic “miracle,” major socio-economic inequalities persisted
under military rule. The degree of income inequality in the country during this period
was likely the highest of any of the newly industrializing countries (Skidmore 1989, 285).
Income inequality grew substantially between 1960 and 1970, and its growth continued
between 1970 and 1980, albeit at a slower rate (Skidmore 1989, 286). The collective
rights of labor that would enable workers to push for change were also relatively limited.
Union organizing and militancy was difficult because many of the unions were controlled
and manipulated by Brazil’s Ministry of Labor (Skidmore 2010, 173). Brazil also likely
had one of the world’s highest land concentrations during this period (Skidmore 1989,
298). Government policies between 1978 and 1984 that favored large, capital-intensive
landholdings had contributed to a rise in the number of agricultural workers with little or
no land from 6.7 million to 10.6 million (Skidmore 1989, 298).
National Regime Transition
In 1974, the military regime began a gradual and controlled process of political
liberalization, which enabled a democratic opposition to expand and become more
effective over the next several years (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 2). Political
liberalization gained more traction as the government faced electoral setbacks, internal
conflict increased within the army, and serious problems emerged in the economic sphere
(Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 3). In 1979, substantial political liberalization occurred
when Congress passed an amnesty bill allowing exiled politicians and left-wing activists
to return to the country (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 3). By 1985, as the presidential
election neared, the moderate members of the opposition party, the PMDB (Party of the
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Brazilian Democratic Movement), knew the only way that an opposition candidate could
win the presidency was if there was a split within the government party, the PDS (Social
Democratic Party) (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 4). A split occurred when a group of
PDS members refused to support the PDS candidate and left the party to form the PFL
(Party of the Liberal Front) (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 4). Negotiations between the
PFL and the PMDB resulted in the formation of the Democratic Alliance, whose primary
intent was to defeat the PDS candidate in the presidential election (Kinzo and Dunkerley
2003, 4-5). In exchange for the PFL’s support for the PMDB’s presidential candidate,
Tancredo Neves, the PMDB nominated a former PDS member, Jose Sarney, to be the
vice-presidential candidate (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 5). On January 15, 1985, Neves
and Sarney won the election in the electoral college, as there was yet no direct
presidential elections in Brazil (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 5). Neves had cultivated
good relations with the military, which ensured that it would remain neutral during the
presidential succession (Pinheiro 2009, 201). Many Brazilians were overjoyed to have
their first civilian president in twenty-one years (Pinheiro 2009, 201). However, Neves
became ill on the eve of the inauguration, died months later, and was succeeded by
Sarney (Kinzo and Dunkerley 2003, 5). Despite a return to civilian rule, the military
remained highly influential in the Sarney government.
Class and the State
Although the military establishment had withdrawn from formal political power
in 1985, it continued to be an influential force within the civilian state (Zirker 1993,88).
Military ministers occupied the presidential cabinet, which included the ministers of the
army, navy, and air force, as well as the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and the
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chief of the National Information Service (SNI) (Zirker 1993, 88). These senior military
officers attempted to mediate between the civilian state and the military establishment,
both of which had contending demands (Zirker 1993, 88). The military ministers were
particularly concerned with continuing the economic and social policies that had been
pursued under the dictatorship, such as adhering to conservative positions on strike law
reform and agrarian reform (Zirker 1993, 88; Skidmore 1989, 271). They also continued
to push for measures that directly benefitted the military, which included support for the
military budget, increases in military pay, and preservation of the state-controlled arms
industry (Zirker 1993, 89). In many instances, the military ministers continued to act
unilaterally regarding key policy issues, such as sending military units to repress labor
strikes and pursuing controversial nuclear projects without any discussion in Congress
(Linz and Stepan 1996, 169).
The state also continued to be penetrated and captured by social groups after the
transition to civilian rule (Weyland 1997-1998, 71). Previously, under military rule,
business groups and professional associations established links with state officials in
agencies that impacted their interests the most (Weyland 1997-1998, 71). These links
persisted under civilian rule, and many of the officials given posts in the new government
had strong ties to business groups (Weyland 1997-1998, 71-72). This enabled these
groups to influence decision-making and policy implementation in a way that favored
their interests, such as increasing state spending on behalf of their businesses and limiting
the amount their businesses were taxed (Weyland 1997-1998, 72-73). Landowners also
maintained strong connections to the state through the military. Despite many senior
military officers coming from middle class backgrounds, they had developed a mutually
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supportive relationship with the large landholders (Zirker 1993, 90). Landowners had
provided the last of the military governments with unwavering electoral support, while
the military’s officer corps provided strong support for a right-wing landowners’
organization, the Rural Democratic Union (UDR) (Zirker 1993, 90). President Sarney
himself was a landholder in Maranhao, a state with conspicuous inequalities in land
distribution and living standards (Skidmore 1989, 302). Under civilian rule, state
autonomy and internal unity continued to decline further, a process that began under the
military dictatorship (Weyland 1997-1998, 74).
Trade union activity continued to be controlled by the state under the new civilian
government through a corporatist union structure that remained fundamentally unchanged
since 1943 (Boito 1994, 7). As part of this structure, unions were required to register
with the state and were organized by occupational categories (Boito 1994, 7). Only one
union per occupational category was allowed to represent workers within a designated
municipality in accordance with the principle of unicidade sindical (Boito 1994, 7). The
union in each municipality had the authority to impose union dues on all workers within
the municipality, even if they were not members of that union (Boito 1994, 7). If
conflicts arose, the union represented its members before the Labor Court, an appendage
of the judiciary, which had the jurisdiction to settle disputes and supervise negotiations
between unions and employers (Boito 1994, 7).
Expectations of Change in Socio-Economic Inequalities
Before and during his presidential campaign, Neves indicated that he wished to
address three broad socio-economic inequalities in Brazil, one of which was income
inequality. In the 1982 manifesto of the PMDB, Neves’s political party, the proposed
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wage policy promised a higher real minimum wage rate through “the gradual recovery of
the minimum wage’s buying power” (Skidmore 1989, 290). During his speeches, Neves
often levelled criticisms at the economic policies of the military governments, which had
favored increasing growth before redistributing wealth (Skidmore 1989, 288). A second
of the socio-economic inequalities that Neves indicated he wished to address concerned
unequal collective labor rights. In his speeches, Neves reaffirmed the PMDB’s proposals
for reforming labor legislation (Skidmore 1989, 289). According to the PMDB 1982
manifesto, these reforms should include developing union autonomy by liberating unions
from government intervention, fully restoring the right to strike for unions by expanding
the latitude of legal strikes, and potentially creating a central workers’ organization with a
constitution (Skidmore 1989, 289). A third of the socio-economic inequalities that Neves
indicated he wished to address concerned land inequality. In 1985, Neves sponsored the
development of the National Agrarian Reform Plan to redistribute land to impoverished
families, and he promised to implement this at the beginning of his term (Garcia and
Palmeira 2009, 47).
While on the campaign trail, Neves had inspired large demonstrations of support
from the population and was given the titles of “protest candidate” and the “President of
Hope” (Skidmore 1989, 256; 261). One poll in October of 1984 showed that Neves had
69.5 percent support, while his opponent had only 18.7 percent support (Skidmore 1989,
253). Strong support for Neves became even more apparent after his death, during the
transportation of his body back to his birthplace in Sao Joao del Rey. Millions of people
filled the streets to show their respect, with approximately two million in Sao Paulo,
300,000 in Brasilia, and another million in Belo Horizonte (Skidmore 1989, 261). The
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overwhelming show of support for Neves suggests that many Brazilians, including
workers and peasants, had high expectations for his presidency. These expectations
likely included the enactment of Neves’s proposed reforms to address the socio-economic
inequalities of income inequality, unequal collective labor rights, and land inequality,
reforms which were indicated in his party’s manifesto, his speeches, and his proposed
initiatives. The reforms enacted by Sarney, however, failed to meet the expectations of
many Brazilians, especially workers and peasants.
Income Inequality and State Violence
The economic conditions that the Sarney government had inherited from the last
of the military governments were decidedly mixed. On the one hand, Brazil’s economy
was experiencing rapid growth in 1985, with the GDP increasing at 8.3 percent, making it
the fastest growing economy in the world for that year (Skidmore 1989, 279). On the
other hand, this growth was dependent on consumer durable goods; therefore, it primarily
benefitted industrial workers, while lower-paid urban and rural workers saw minimal
gains (Skidmore 1989, 279). Inflation was also significantly high in 1985, with an
inflation rate of 222 percent, creating concern that continued growth at its current rate
would increase inflation further (Skidmore 1989, 279). In this regard, the economy could
reach full capacity in some sectors, making it unable to satisfy the increase in demand,
thereby creating supply problems, and potentially causing demand inflation to merge with
inertial inflation, triggering a price explosion (Skidmore 1989, 279).
The Sarney government began its administration by enacting certain reforms to
address income inequality, which had been previously proposed by Neves. In an effort to
keep the PMDB’s promise to raise the minimum wage, as well as to regain part of the
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loss in the minimum wage’s real value that occurred under the military governments, the
Sarney government declared in November 1985 a semi-annual minimum wage increase
of 5.6 more than the inflation rate of the past six months (Skidmore 1989, 294). To
address inflation, the Sarney government introduced the Cruzado Plan in February 1986,
which, in addition to providing several initiatives to curb inflation (e.g., an indefinite
price freeze), delivered other measures to facilitate wage increases (Skidmore 1989, 280).
One of these measures was an adjustment of the minimum wage to its average value over
the previous six months, plus a bonus of 8 percent (after this initial adjustment, a sliding
scale would automatically compensate workers whenever inflation hit 20 percent a year)
(Skidmore 1989, 279-280). A second measure to facilitate wage increases allowed
workers to negotiate further wage increases with employees (Skidmore 1989, 280). In
addition to these measures, an unemployment benefit was created to assist unemployed
workers (Skidmore 1989, 280).
The Cruzado Plan was initially a success in addressing inflation, with inflation
dropping to less than 2 percent for the next few months (Skidmore 2010, 184). Brazilians
were enthusiastic about the new plan, with millions behaving as “price inspectors” at
their local stores by confronting store managers who increased prices in violation of the
price freeze (an act that President Sarney had publicly encouraged) (Skidmore 1989, 280;
Baer and Beckerman 1989, 44). Under the Cruzado Plan, real wages also rose
dramatically, and many firms spontaneously provided wage increases above the plan’s
formula because rapid economic growth had created labor shortages in certain
occupational categories (Baer and Beckerman 1989, 44). Knowing that prices were
frozen, workers who had received real wage increases went on spending sprees, resulting
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in an increase in excess demand (Skidmore 1989, 281). By mid-1986, the economy
began to overheat, but the technocrats of the Sarney government refused to take
corrective measures because these would have cut short the consumer boom, something
they wanted to avoid with congressional and gubernatorial elections approaching in
November (Skidmore 2010, 184). The technocrats’ strategy worked, and Sarney and the
PMDB won an impressive victory in the elections, increasing its delegation in the
Chamber of Deputies and its number of Senators, as well as sweeping the gubernatorial
elections in the most populous states (Skidmore 2010, 184). However, at the end of
1986, there was a resurgence of inflation and a sharp decline in the purchasing power of
workers, leading to emergent recession in the first half of 1987 (Baer and Beckerman
1989, 60). By the end of 1987, the Cruzado Plan was considered a failed stabilization
plan, with inflation for the year reaching nearly 416 percent (Skidmore 2010, 185).
Despite the enactment of reforms to address income inequality by the Sarney
government, such as an increase in the real minimum wage and measures to facilitate
wage increases, disposable income inequality in Brazil continued to steadily rise from a
level of 51.6 in 1985 to a level of 54 in 1989, the last full year of President Sarney’s term
(Figure 3.1: Solt 2019).
The Sarney government’s efforts to address income inequality failed the
expectations of many Brazilians. They perceived the Cruzado Plan as nothing more than
a vulgar political manipulation in which prices were frozen long enough to allow a weak
and unpopular government to secure a victory in the November elections, and then
unfreezing prices less than a week after the elections as part of the Cruzado Plan II (Baer
and Beckerman 1989, 61). Workers were specifically dissatisfied with the status of their
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wages, which was expressed through a surge of labor conflict in the form of strikes and
lockouts, notably during the years of the Cruzado Plan’s implementation.
Figure 3.1: Disposable Income Inequality (Brazil)
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In 1985, the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors was at 843,
then increased dramatically to 1,494 in 1986, and then increased dramatically again to
2,369 in 1987 (Figure 3.2: van der Velden 2018). The prime motivating factors behind
all of the strikes during this surge in labor conflict were issues of wage restitution, and
concerning general strikes specifically, it was resistance to decrees that were further
restricting workers’ wages (Antunes 1994, 33). Industrial workers were struggling
against wage reductions, while salaried workers and civil servants were struggling against
wage deterioration and impoverishment (Antunes 1994, 33).
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Figure 3.2: Total Number of Strikes and Lockouts (Brazil)
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State violence that is indicative of state terrorism also rose during the surge of
labor conflict in the form of strikes and lockouts from 1985 through 1987. In 1985, the
level of political terror was at a level of 3, then increased to a level of 4 in 1986, but then
dipped back down to a level of 3 in 1987; (Figure 3.3: Gibney et al. 2019). There was
also variation in the frequency of human rights violations from 1985 through 1987. From
1985 through 1986, extrajudicial killings were at a frequency of “occasionally,” but then
rose to “frequently” in 1987 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The frequency of
political imprisonment also rose from 1985 through 1987, occurring “not at all” in 1985
and 1986, and then rising to “occasionally” in 1987 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay
2014). The frequency of torture, which was occurring “frequently” from 1985 through
1986, dropped to a frequency of “occasionally” in 1987 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay
2014). The frequency of disappearances remained at “not at all” from 1985 through 1987
(Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
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Figure 3.3: PTS Amnesty International (Brazil)
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The increase in the level of political terror and the increases in the frequency of
extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment, which are all indicative of state
terrorism, do not appear to be related to the surge of labor conflicts in the form of strikes
and lockouts from 1985 through 1987 associated with wage restitution, and more broadly,
income inequality. The vast majority of strikes were carried out by urban workers during
this period. Workers in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing
engaged in 0 strikes out of a total of 1,494 strikes and lockouts in 1986 and just 120
strikes out of a total of 2,369 strikes and lockouts in 1987 (Figure 3.4: van der Velden
2018). Despite the overwhelming number of urban workers engaged in labor conflicts
during this period, the Amnesty International Reports for this period, on which the
Political Terror Scale that measures political terror is based, do not indicate any forms of
state violence directed specifically at striking urban workers or any urban workers
associated with union activities from 1985 through 1987, or for the remainder of Sarney’s
term in office.
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Figure 3.4: Number of Strikes in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (Brazil)
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Unequal Collective Labor Rights and State Violence
The Sarney government also began its administration by developing certain
proposals to address unequal collective labor rights, an issue area that Neves had
previously indicated he wished to address. The Sarney government’s proposals
concerned reforming labor legislation through three labor law reforms. The first was a
new strike law proposal to replace a preexisting July 1964 law that was enacted by the
first military government after the 1964 coup to enable the regime to repress any union
activity (Skidmore 1989, 296). It was drafted by Labor Minister Almir Pazzianotto, a
former lawyer for a metalworkers union who had strong opinions regarding how the
government should interact with unions and workers (Skidmore 1989, 290-296). He
realized that the Sarney government could take several steps to improve the bargaining
power and economic situation of urban workers (Skidmore 1989, 290). However,
President Sarney and Labor Minister Pazzianotto were only able to secure a tenuous
government consensus on the degree to which the new strike law proposal would go in
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legalizing strikes (Skidmore 1989, 295). This was due to the influence of the higher
military establishment, who opposed any weakening of the power of the government in
its relations with striking workers, and the Sao Paulo industrialists who opposed it
because they had a permanent advantage over workers through the existing law
(Skidmore 1989, 295). In contrast to this, hundreds of union leaders and members tried
to pressure Pazzianotto into reducing the power of the government to intervene in strikes
(Skidmore 1989, 295-296).
The Sarney government’s proposal for a new strike law, the result of a complex
process of intra-government compromises, consisted of six primary features. The first
feature was that the proposed law would expand the number of workers from essential
sectors who were permitted to strike, while still prohibiting a wide range from engaging
in strikes, including hospital workers, dockworkers, and civil servants (Skidmore 1989,
296). The second feature was that strikes could only be authorized through a secret
ballot, as opposed to the voice vote that was regularly used by many unions (Skidmore
1989, 296). The third feature was that employers and workers could utilize an outside
arbitrator to help settle disputes between them (Skidmore 1989, 296). The fourth feature
was that the bureaucratic obstacles to calling a strike would be reduced (Skidmore 1989,
296). The fifth feature was that employers would still be prohibited from engaging in
lockouts of workers, despite a concerted effort by employers to get them legalized within
the new law (Skidmore 1989, 296). The sixth feature was that the government would still
hold the utmost authority over strikes and related actions (Skidmore 1989, 296).
The second and third labor law reforms drafted by the Sarney government were
advocated as a way to expand union democracy (Skidmore 1989, 296). One of these
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reforms would abolish the compulsory union dues known as contribuicao sindical
(Skidmore 1989, 296). The other reform would abolish the rule that only one union was
permitted to represent the workers of one trade within a designated municipality
(Skidmore 1989, 296). Therefore, it would allow competing unions to represent workers
in different trades within each municipality (Skidmore 1989, 296). It was believed that
this reform would facilitate union pluralism, which would enhance union democracy
because union leaders would have to foster greater member loyalty in order to prevent
rival union organizers from attracting members (Skidmore 1989, 297). However, by
1987, the efforts made by the Sarney government to reform the corporatist union
structure had faded from the government’s agenda (Skidmore 1989, 306). Labor Minister
Pazzianotto was preoccupied with preventing the initiation of strikes and negotiating
strike settlements in addition to dealing with other economic concerns (Skidmore 1989,
306). Despite the Sarney government’s initial efforts to prepare legislation to address
unequal collective labor rights by reforming the corporatist union structure, the level of
violations of overall collective labor rights in Brazil continued to steadily rise from a
level of 11 in 1986 to a level of 18.75 in 1989, the last full year of President Sarney’s
term (although there was an initial drop from a level of 13 in 1985 to a level of 11 in
1986) (Figure 3.5: Mosley 2011).
The Sarney government’s efforts to address unequal collective labor rights failed
the expectations of many workers. Many militant unionists immediately criticized the
government’s new strike law proposal (Skidmore 1989, 296). Gilmar Carneiro, a
member of the national directorate of the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT) denounced the
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Figure 3.5: Violations of Overall Collective Labor Rights (Brazil)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

18.75
16.5
13

13
11
8

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Source: Mosley 2011
strike law proposal as nothing but “a more flexible law for repressing strikes” (Skidmore
1989, 296). Many unionists were concerned over the feature of the law that required a
minimum secret vote to initiate a strike, which was believed would make strikes less
likely (Skidmore 1989, 296). The well-established pelegos, or state-controlled unions,
opposed both of the additional labor law reforms, the abolition of compulsory dues and
the abolition of the rule that only one union could represent workers of one trade within a
designated municipality (Skidmore 1989, 297). Although issues of wage restitution were
the prime motivating factors behind most of the strikes during the surge in labor conflict
between 1985 and 1987 (Figure 3.2: van der Velden 2018), other issues concerning
collective labor rights were contributing factors. These issues included the intensification
of work, worker discharges, attempts to brutalize workers, factory despotism, and the
militarization of strikes (Antunes 1994, 32-33).
State violence in the form of political terror, which is indicative of state terrorism,
rose during the surge of labor conflict in the form of strikes and lockouts from 1985
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through 1987 (Figure 3.3: Gibney et al. 2019). In addition to this, certain human rights
violations, which are also indicative of state terrorism, increased in frequency from 1985
through 1987. The frequency of extrajudicial killings increased from “occasionally” to
“frequently,” and the frequency of political imprisonment increased from “not at all” to
“occasionally” (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The frequency of torture decreased
from “frequently” to “occasionally,” and the frequency of disappearances remained at
“not at all” from 1985 through 1987 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
The increase in the level of political terror and the increases in the frequency of
extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment, which are all indicative of state
terrorism, do not appear to be related to the surge of labor conflicts in the form of strikes
and lockouts from 1985 through 1987 associated with wage restitution (more broadly,
income inequality), and to a lesser extent, issues concerning collective labor rights. The
vast majority of strikes were carried out by urban workers during this period, rather than
rural workers. However, despite the overwhelming number of urban workers engaged in
labor conflicts during this period, the Amnesty International Reports for this period, on
which the Political Terror Scale that measures political terror is based, do not indicate
any forms of state violence directed specifically at striking urban workers or any urban
workers associated with union activities from 1985 through 1987, or for the remainder of
Sarney’s term in office. Yet, some rural workers were the targets of violence over issues
of collective labor rights; but these issues appear to be inextricably intertwined with the
more prominent issue concerning to rural workers, agrarian reform, and more broadly,
land inequality.
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Land Inequality and State Violence
In addition to developing reforms to address income inequality and the unequal
collective rights of labor, the Sarney government also began its administration by
working out certain proposals to address land inequality, another issue area that Neves
had previously indicated he wished to address. The Sarney government’s proposal
concerned agrarian reform in which land redistribution would be the focus. In May 1985,
President Sarney declared an ambitious proposal for agrarian reform before the fourth
national congress of CONTAG (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers)
(Skidmore 1989, 300). The proposal would use as its starting point the 1964 Estatuto da
Terra (land law), which was established under the first military government as the legal
basis for land redistribution (Skidmore 1989, 298). This law penalized landowners who
did not fully utilize their land through a progressive land tax, which acted as a means to
redistribute land (Skidmore 1989, 298-299). However, under the military dictatorship,
the law failed to significantly redistribute land because the tax scheme was never applied
aggressively, many landowners were protected by limitations on expropriation powers,
and the successive military governments were unwilling to allocate the government funds
required for compensation (Skidmore 1989, 299). With the 1964 land law as the basis,
President Sarney’s proposal would strive to settle 7.1 million landless families on 480
million hectares of land by the year 2000 (Skidmore 1989, 300). The source of 85
percent of the land to be used would come from privately held tracts of land known as
latifundios (Skidmore 1989, 300). The National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (INCRA) would be responsible for selecting the land for redistribution, giving
priority to areas of conflict over ownership (Skidmore 1989, 300). Compensation for
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land expropriations would be by twenty-year government bonds, which were redeemable
after twenty years and would include an additional 6 percent, as well as inflation
adjustment (Skidmore 1989, 300). The rural workers at the fourth national congress of
CONTAG cheered President Sarney and his proposal for agrarian reform (Skidmore
1989, 300).
In contrast to the support the Sarney government’s proposal for agrarian reform
inspired in the rural workers of CONTAG, it also created a fierce opposition to its
enactment. Opponents of the proposal included the higher military establishment and
some conservatives in Congress, who argued that communists and other radicals were
behind its creation (Skidmore 1989, 301). In addition to CONTAG, supporters of the
plan included the Church hierarchy, although the more radical members of the Church
found it to be too cautious (Skidmore 1989, 301). Because of the controversy the
proposal had created, the government drafted a new agrarian reform plan in October 1985
that was vastly different than the first proposal (Skidmore 1989, 301). Instead of
privately held lands being used as the main source of land for redistribution,
expropriations would primarily target public lands, leaving cultivated private lands
undisturbed (Skidmore 1989, 301). These expropriations would be made primarily in the
far north of Brazil and nearly half of the recipients of the land would come from the
impoverished areas of the Northeast (Skidmore 1989, 301). In 1986, the plan would
initially redistribute land to approximately 150,000 peasant families, and by the end of
1989, roughly 1,400,000 families were to receive a total of 43 million hectares (Skidmore
1989, 301).
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In June 1986, President Sarney signed 37 decrees that authorized the initial land
expropriations, which totaled 257,135 hectares in 12 different states, and he reaffirmed
his promise to follow through on the remainder of the agrarian reform plan as scheduled
(Skidmore 1989, 302). However, by 1987, progress on land reform had subsided because
acquiring the billions of dollars required to accomplish the degree of land redistribution
stipulated in the 1986 agrarian reform plan would be problematic, considering that
foreign creditors were pressuring the Sarney government to decrease public expenditures
(Skidmore 1989, 306). The Sarney government’s initial efforts to address land inequality
by carrying out agrarian reform corresponds with a moderate drop in land inequality from
a level of 80.375 in 1985 to a level of 80 in 1988, but it then plateaued at a level of 80
until 1990, the year Sarney left office (Figure 3.6: Landman and Larizza 2018).
Figure 3.6: Land Inequality (Brazil)
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The Sarney government’s efforts to address land inequality failed the expectations
of many rural workers. The new agrarian reform plan of October 1985 was immediately
condemned by rural workers’ groups and Church radicals as a betrayal, and INCRA
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director Jose Gomes da Silva resigned from his post in protest (Skidmore 1989, 301). By
1987, the pro-agrarian sectors of society concluded that President Sarney had deceived
them by promising them an agrarian reform plan that was ultimately impossible to
implement (Robles 2018, 7-8). In response to this betrayal, members of the Landless
Rural Laborers’ Movement (MST), a movement that arose from former peasants who lost
their farms to dam construction, agro-industries, and cattle ranching, went on the
offensive through intensified land invasions and occupations (Welch 2006, 43; Robles
2018, 8). These offensive measures, in turn, intensified land conflicts with landowners,
with 767 landless peasants being murdered from 1985 to 1989 (Robles 2018, 8). Labor
conflict in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing also surged
during this period, with the number of strikes rising dramatically in these sectors from 0
in 1986 to 120 in 1987, and then rising again to 143 in 1988 (Figure 3.4: van der Velden
2018).
State violence that is indicative of state terrorism also rose during the surge of
labor conflict in the form of strikes in the rural occupational sector of agriculture,
forestry, and fishing from 1987 through 1988. In 1987, the level of political terror was at
a level of 3, then increased to a level of 4 in 1988 (Figure 3.3: Gibney et al. 2019). There
was also variation in the frequency of human rights violations, which are also indicative
of state terrorism, from 1987 through 1988. In 1986, extrajudicial killings were at a
frequency of “occasionally,” but then rose to “frequently” in 1987, and then dropped to a
frequency of “occasionally” in 1988 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The
frequency of political imprisonment also rose, starting at a frequency of “not at all” in
1986, then rising to “occasionally” in 1987, and then dropping to “not at all” in 1988
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(Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The frequency of torture, which was occurring
“frequently” in 1986, dropped in 1987 to a frequency of “occasionally,” but then rose
again to “frequently” in 1988 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The frequency of
disappearances remained at “not at all” from 1986 through 1988 (Cingarelli, Richards,
and Clay 2014).
The increase in the level of political terror and the frequency of extrajudicial
killings and political imprisonment, which are all indicative of state terrorism, do appear
to be related to the surge of labor conflict in the form of strikes in the rural occupational
sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing from 1987 through 1988, as well as to the
intensification of land invasions and occupations carried out by members of MST from
1985 through 1989, as described by Robles (2018). Rural workers, peasants, and their
allies were the targets of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and
political imprisonment, as well as torture, from 1987 through 1988. This is evident in the
Amnesty International Reports concerning the years 1987 and 1988.
In 1987, peasants and their allies were victims of extrajudicial killings. Amnesty
International reports:
There were continuing politically motivated attacks on peasant leaders and
their advisers, a number of whom were killed. While these killings were
mostly carried out by pistoleiros (gunmen) or other private security
personnel employed by local landowners or their organizations, there was
no evidence that the Brazilian authorities intended to tackle this problem
(Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 98).

Peasants were also victims of political imprisonment. Amnesty International reports:
In January…five peasants were arrested [by police] without warrant in Para
State and held together with a sixth man arrested in neighbouring Goias
State….The Brazilian Constitution stipulates that arrest may be made only
when the accused is caught in flagrante delictu or when a warrant or judicial
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order from the competent authority has been issued. Neither of these
applied in this case (Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 97).

While these six peasants were held in police custody, they were also victims of torture.
Amnesty International reports: “They were held incommunicado for between seven and
10 days, during which time they alleged that they were tortured….Despite their
allegations of torture and ill-treatment, the six were denied access to lawyers and were
not allowed medical examinations until some 30 to 40 days later” (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1988, 97).
In 1988, rural workers and peasants were victims of extrajudicial killings.
Amnesty International reports: “During 1988 several peasants’ and rural workers’ leaders
involved in land disputes were killed with the apparent acquiescence of local state
authorities” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 108). One of the leaders killed
was Francisco Domingos Ramos, President of the Rural Workers Trade Union of Pancas,
Espirito Santo state, who was shot dead by a gunman two weeks before a court was due
to investigate his allegation of death threats made against him by a landowner (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1989, 108-109). Another of these murdered leaders was
Francisco Alves Mendes Filho, the President of the Rural Workers Trade Union of
Xapuri, Acre state. Before he was killed, he had appealed repeatedly to local, state, and
federal authorities to arrest those he believed had made six previous attempts on his life,
but his appeals were unsuccessful (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109). Prior
to the killing, police had allowed these individuals to roam freely throughout the region
and repeatedly failed to enforce arrest warrants against them, despite the suspects’
convictions for previous murders (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109). Allies
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of rural workers and peasants were also victims of extrajudicial killings. Amnesty
International reports:
On 6 December Joao Batista, a land rights lawyer and Socialist Party
representative in the Legislative Assembly in Para state, was shot dead in
front of his family. On the day of the killing he had told the Assembly that
two military police had made death threats against him. By the end of
December the police had failed to obtain a full statement from his widow –
the principal witness to his killing – despite her efforts to provide an account
of the events (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109).

This study concludes that the human rights violations committed against rural
workers, peasants, and their allies from 1987 through 1988, which includes extrajudicial
killings, political imprisonment, and torture, constitute acts of state terrorism and perform
a specific political function. How this conclusion was drawn is discussed in detail in the
analysis contained within Chapter 5.
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IV. THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1986-1992)
Authoritarian Period
In the first two decades of the Philippine republic, no president won reelection,
indicating that presidential policies were ineffective in addressing the country’s chronic
economic problems, such as inequality and uneven development (Abinales and Amoroso
2005, 193). By 1965, a former lawyer and Filipino senator, Ferdinand Marcos, became
president, which was partly achieved through a tactical alliance with the Lopez sugarmedia-energy dynasty (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 194). While campaigning, Marcos
had promised to end inefficiency and to reform the corrupt political system (Abinales and
Amoroso 2005, 194). He had also promised to reform the police, as crime was on the rise
and police performance was on the decline in the Philippines (McCoy 2009, 385-386).
The United States, which had a long history of intervention in the country, played a
significant role in this reform. It had both economic and strategic interests in the
Philippines, such as two military bases, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 209). The US Office of Public Safety (OPS) made
substantial efforts to strengthen the police agencies throughout the country in exchange
for reforms made by President Marcos (McCoy 2009, 387). From 1969 to 1973, the OPS
set up ten regional centers to train 23,902 police officers (60 percent of the country’s
total), sent 284 police officers to the US for advanced training, established a Manilabased anti-riot squad composed of 2,000 officers, installed 55 provincial communications
networks, and built an integrated communications grid (McCoy 2009, 387).
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, student protests became more frequent and
intense on Manila’s college campuses over issues that included high tuition, restrictions
on academic freedom, and the US-led war in Vietnam (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 197198). Marcos created further crisis in the country, as an extraordinary government deficit
forced him to float the currency, resulting in soaring inflation (Abinales and Amoroso
2005, 198). Social and political activism continued to become more persistent among
various groups (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 198). Younger clergy members of the
Catholic Church became concerned with issues of social justice and became directly
involved with furthering the goals of workers and peasants (Abinales and Amoroso 2005,
199). The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) emerged in 1968, established
alliances with workers’ unions and peasant organizations, and in 1969, formed the New
People’s Army (NPA) (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 199). In 1972, the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) also materialized in the Philippines, which was a vanguard
movement that sought to establish an independent republic consisting of Mindinao, the
Sulu archipelago, and Palawan Island (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 217).
Marcos began to portray the student protests as evidence of a widespread
communist conspiracy and the plans of his political opponents as evidence of a rightwing conspiracy (Overholt 1986, 1140). Under orders, state agents riddled the Defense
Minister’s empty car with bullets and blew up minor targets around Manila, while the
Marcos government publicly stated that communist guerillas were threatening the capital
(Overholt 1986, 1140). Marcos used these and other alleged threats to justify a
declaration of martial law in 1972 (Overholt 1986, 1140). Prior to this declaration,
thousands of Marcos’s opponents were arrested, and private military forces were
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disarmed (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 205). In the weeks following the declaration, an
estimated 50,000 people deemed to be “subversives” were also rounded up by the regime,
which included politicians, students, journalists, and union leaders (McCoy 2009, 403;
Casper 2000, 149). Both houses of Congress were closed, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) shut down schools, religious establishments, and media outlets
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 205). In the US, bipartisan support for martial law
appeared in Congress, and military assistance to the Marcos government was increased
dramatically from $18.5 million in 1972 to $45.3 million in 1973 (Abinales and Amoroso
2005, 205-209).
Under martial law, systemic police corruption and human rights violations
continued to become more and more commonplace (McCoy 2009, 403). High-ranking
police commanders from the Philippine Constabulary’s (PC) anti-subversion squads, the
Metrocom Intelligence Service Group (MISG), and the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit
(CSU) coalesced into a privileged elite that acted with impunity and unchecked legal
authority (McCoy 2009, 403). As martial law continued, police engaged in widespread
human rights abuses, with the psychological and physical torture of political dissidents
and criminal suspects becoming standard procedure (McCoy 2009, 403). “Salvaging,” a
specific form of terrorism, also became a common practice among police, which
consisted of dumping a deceased torture victim in public so that their scarred bodies were
on display for the community to witness (McCoy 2009, 403). In 1976, the PC established
the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), a paramilitary force that the military armed
and trained to carry out counter-insurgency operations, which became involved in
extrajudicial killings, massacres, mutilations, torture, and even cannibalism (Hedman and
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Sidel 2000, 53). Ultimately, under the Marcos dictatorship, state agents killed 3,257
people, tortured an estimated 35,000, and arrested approximately 70,000 (McCoy 2009,
403). Roughly 2,520 victims were salvaged, which amounts to 77 percent of the total
number of Filipinos killed by state agents (McCoy 2009, 403).
The Marcos dictatorship was characterized by the consolidation of wealth and
power within a small elite through “crony capitalism” in which monopoly, special access,
and brute force were the basis of the economic system rather than competition (Abinales
and Amoroso 2005, 214). The income inequality that resulted is made clear in a 1988
World Bank Report, which states: “The Philippines has one of the most unequal income
distributions among middle-income countries: in 1985 the top ten per cent of the
population had more than 15 times the income of the poorest 10 per cent” (Goodno 1991,
110). The collective rights of labor were also constrained, impeding collective action for
change. The Marcos dictatorship enacted controls on labor unions and the right to strike,
as well as political demonstrations (Goodno 1991, 107). Government initiatives to
address land inequality, such as an agrarian-reform program, were also failing under the
dictatorship. By the early 1980s, less than 25 percent of those targeted to receive land
had actually received any land, and less than 17 percent of the land targeted for
redistribution had actually been redistributed (Goodno 1991, 78).
National Regime Transition
In January 1981, Marcos lifted martial law but continued to rule by presidential
decree (Casper 2000, 149). In August 1983, ex-senator Benigno Aquino Jr., the top
political rival of Marcos and an outspoken critic of his regime, returned to the Philippines
and was immediately shot dead after a military escort surrounded him as he exited the
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aircraft (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 221). Demonstrations ensued throughout the
country, with participants claiming Marcos was complicit in the assassination and
demanding his resignation (Casper 2000, 152). These increased in intensity for the next
three years, with a variety of groups joining the opposition, including members of the
business community (Casper 2005, 152). To allay US concerns that he was losing
control, Marcos announced that he would hold the presidential election in 1986, one year
earlier than was scheduled (Casper 2005, 152).
Corazon Aquino, the widow of the assassinated Benigno, emerged as the
moderate opposition’s presidential candidate (Casper 2000, 152). The elections were
held on February 7 but were marred by the regime’s tactics of intimidation, payoffs, and
voter fraud (Casper 2000, 152). Both Marcos and Aquino declared they won the election,
but the National Assembly, which was controlled by a coalition of pro-Marcos parties,
announced Marcos as the winner (Casper 2000, 153). On February 22, anti-Marcos
elements within the AFP launched a coup, which failed, causing them to retreat to two
military camps on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) (Abinales and Amoroso 2005,
224). Aquino’s supporters surrounded the camps to prevent a counterattack, and more
defections within Marcos’s military and police occurred (Abinales and Amoroso 2005,
224-225). The US withdrew support for Marcos, and he was eventually airlifted to exile
in Hawaii (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 225). On February 25, 1986, Aquino was sworn
in as President of the Philippines (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 225).
Class and the State
Although the Marcos dictatorship had been defeated and a new regime was in
power, the state under the Aquino government was far from consolidated. Under the new
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regime, elite factions fragmented and unpredictably changed their alliances (Parrenas
1993, 70). One such group was the military officers’ corps, which broadly fragmented
into a more moderate element and a more radical element (Parrenas 1993, 70). The
moderate element of the military officers’ corps, which consisted of greater numbers than
the more radical element, was willing to work to achieve its goals within the parameters
of the new regime, while providing passive support to the Aquino government (Parrenas
1993, 70). The smaller, more radical element was hostile to the new regime and was
determined to overthrow the Aquino government through violent means (Parrenas 1993,
70). This is evident in the seven coup attempts that were launched throughout the Aquino
government’s time in power, the last of which in 1989 required US fighter-jet flyovers as
a deterrent in order to be turned back (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 233).
Another of the elite factions that fragmented under the new regime was the
traditional landed elite. The landed, or agrarian, elite have a long history of domination
over society in the Philippines, which was established as a result of Spanish and
American colonial administrative styles and a world demand for Philippine agricultural
raw materials (Hawes 1987, 50). Many members of the traditional landed elite were
previously disenfranchised when Marcos imposed martial law in 1972 (Bello 1986,
1022). President Aquino herself was a member of the landed elite, being connected
through blood and marriage to two of the most prominent landlord families in Central
Luzon (Bello 1986, 1022). Under the new Aquino government, the landed elite returned
to the political scene, but their dominance was no longer intact because of the emergence
of new elites, which included a wealthy entrepreneurial class, middle-class professionals,
senior military officers, civil servants, and civic leaders (Parrenas 1993, 70). One
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segment of the landed elite was reform-minded and favored the restoration of formal
democracy but wished to maintain the landlord-dominated semi-feudal agrarian structure
that persisted in the Philippines (Bello 1986, 1022). Another segment of the landed elite,
who had originally supported Aquino, realigned themselves with pro-Marcos elements
within society (Parrenas 1993, 70). Other pro-Marcos elements included politicians and
businessmen who sought Marcos’s restoration to power because they were unable to
capitalize on the transition to the Aquino government in 1986 (Parrenas 1993, 73).
Under the Marcos dictatorship, trade union federations were expected to join the
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), a state-sponsored organization
established in 1975 (Hutchison 2016, 190). However, federations that did not become
affiliated with the TUCP, or joined and later withdrew from the congress, were not
targeted for closure by the state (Hutchinson 2016, 190). Conservative trade union
federations were bolstered by the Marcos dictatorship through their affiliation with the
TUCP, and their members were selected for positions in the legislature and as candidates
in Marcos’s political party, further bolstering these federations (Hutchinson 2016, 193).
Despite these privileges, several trade union federations maintained their independence,
and in 1980, a militant left-wing labor center emerged known as the May First Movement
(KMU) (Hutchinson 2016, 193). Under the Aquino government, trade union federations
were permitted instant access to the government because their militancy had contributed
to the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, but the deep divisions between the
federations (notably the TUCP and KMU) prevented them from uniting on issues
concerning labor reforms (Hutchinson 2016, 193-194).
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Expectations of Change in Socio-Economic Inequalities
Corazon Aquino indicated her willingness to address socio-economic inequalities
in the Philippines during her presidential campaign, notably in a speech delivered in
Davao City, Mindinao on January 16, 1986. In this speech, she outlined her program of
reform on a variety of social issues. One of these social issues concerned the broad
socio-economic inequality of income inequality. Regarding income inequality, Aquino
stated: “I believe that, on the whole, the effective solution to the problem of the laboring
poor should lie in the proper understanding of the partnership between labor and capital
in the task of creating wealth, an understanding which should naturally lead to the
equitable sharing of wealth” (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 340). A second socioeconomic inequality Aquino indicated in her speech that she wished to address concerned
unequal collective labor rights. She first noted that “a large proportion of the working
force of the nation are broken victims of the avarice of individuals and of an oppressive
social structure and hostile labor laws” (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 339). To address
this, Aquino pledged to “work for the repeal of repressive laws and for the dismantling of
economic structures which keep workers in a state of quasi-slavery” (Schirmer and
Shalom 1987, 340). A third socio-economic inequality she indicated in her speech that
she wished to address concerned land inequality. According to Aquino, one of the
essential goals of her land reform program was “equitable sharing of the benefits and
ownership of the land” (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 339). To reach this goal, she
proposed that “[f]or long-time settlers and share tenants, land-to-the-tiller must become a
reality,” and “[f]or the growing number of landless workers, resettlement schemes and
cooperative forms of farming can be introduced” (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 339).
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During this particular speech in Davao City, the audience was filled with
excitement, and large numbers of workers and farmers rallied behind Aquino’s bid for the
presidency (Goodno 1991, 6). Other supporters of Aquino included elite and moderate
oppositionists, the Catholic Church, large segments of the broad leftist movement, and
hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens politicized by the assassination of her husband
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 224). Strong support for Aquino became even more
apparent after the Aquino coalition and the Catholic Church called on supporters to
surround the two military camps along EDSA where the anti-Marcos elements of the
AFP had retreated after their failed coup attempt (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 224).
Within a day, more than one million people responded to the call to action and
surrounded the EDSA camps, positioning themselves between the AFP rebels and
Philippine marines flown in to prevent the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 224). The overwhelming show of support for Aquino
during her campaign and the willingness of her supporters to heed her call to action and
risk their lives, suggests that many Filipinos, including workers and peasants, had high
expectations for her presidency. These expectations likely included Aquino’s proposed
reforms to address the socio-economic inequalities of income inequality, unequal
collective labor rights, and land inequality, reforms which were indicated in speeches
during her presidential campaign.
Income Inequality and State Violence
In March 1986, shortly after Aquino was sworn as president, she promulgated the
Provisional Constitution, or the “Freedom Constitution,” which provided for both
legislative and executive powers (Maisrikrod 1999, 360). Aware that her government
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under the Provisional Constitution could be perceived as dictatorial like that of the
Marcos government, President Aquino recognized the necessity of quickly establishing
the rule of law under a new constitution (Maisrikrod 1999, 360). She stated: “Many
critics have expressed fears that I could be worse under the Freedom Constitution. This
is why we need the new Constitution to put everything in place” (Maisrikrod 1999, 360).
In April 1986, President Aquino declared her government’s plans to assemble a
Constitutional Commission and asked the public to submit nominations for potential
members on the commission (Atienzo 2019, 4). The selection process of appointing
members was criticized by some, but the Aquino government justified it by arguing that
an election to appoint members would be both expensive and allow an opening for
disruption by counter-revolutionary elements (Atienzo 2019, 4-5). Those selected as
members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission included politicians, businessmen,
lawyers, and landlords, as well as university professors, health professionals, religious
leaders, journalists, and labor and peasant leaders (Atienzo 2019, 6). Regarding the
profession, education, gender, age, and geographic background of the members selected,
the makeup of the Constitutional Commission was overwhelmingly elitist (Atienzo 2019,
6).
The draft charter for the new constitution (and later the 1987 Constitution)
contains several provisions pertaining to income inequality. A first provision asserts that
an equitable distribution of income is one of the intended goals of the national economy.
It states: “The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
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productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged”
(1987 Philippine Const. art. 12. sec. 1.). A second provision asserts that the Congress
will prioritize reducing economic inequalities and diffusing wealth equitably in the
measures it enacts. It states: “The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the rights of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
distributing wealth and political power for the common good” (1987 Philippine Const.
art. 13. sec. 1.). A third provision asserts that the state will play a role in ensuring
workers an equitable share of the results of production through its regulation of workeremployer relations. It states: “The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and
growth” (1987 Philippine Const. art. 13. sec. 3.).
The drafting process of the new constitution failed the expectations of certain
members of the Constitutional Commission who were hoping to produce a document that
would address issues concerning social and economic inequalities. Wilfredo Villacorta, a
member of the commission, stated:
I was hoping the new constitution would address itself more to social justice
and national sovereignty….But the Constitutional Commission was made
up mainly of people from the upper and middle classes, many were lawyers
and a substantial number of these lawyers worked for multinationals. Some
were big landlords themselves, a lot were businessmen, the majority were
US educated (Goodno 1991, 120).

Several members of the commission who formed a progressive block within the
commission wanted to influence the shape of the draft charter (Goodno 1991, 120). One
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of these members was film director Lino Brocka, who became so frustrated by the
drafting process that he left the commission never to return (Goodno 1991, 120). Two
other progressive members of the commission, Jaime Tadeo, chairman of the KMP
(Farmer’s Movement of the Philippines), and Jose Suarez, an officer of Bayan (an
alliance of left-wing organizations), both signed the completed draft charter but noted
their opposition to its ratification next to their signatures (Goodno 1991, 120). Despite
some opposition, there was an overwhelming vote in favor of ratification of the draft
charter. On February 2, 1987, a plebiscite for the draft charter’s ratification was held,
and 77.04 percent of all votes cast were for ratification (Atienzo 2019, 10). However, it
was reported that only 32 percent of the electorate had actually read the draft charter by
the time of the plebiscite, suggesting that the vote for ratification was based more on
President Aquino’s popularity (Hernandez 1988, 230). In addition to the provisions
included in the 1987 Constitution pertaining to income inequality, the Aquino
government passed a law increasing the minimum wage by 10 pesos (50 cents), which
was lower than that expected by labor (Hernandez 1988, 234). However, despite the
provisions in the 1987 Constitution and the increased minimum wage, disposable income
inequality in the Philippines continued to steadily rise from a level of 42.1 in 1987 to a
level of 42.4 in 1992, the year President Aquino left office (Figure 4.1: Solt 2019).
Even as the level of disposable income inequality continued to steadily rise
throughout President Aquino’s term in office, there was no increase in the overall level of
labor conflict in the form of strikes and lockouts in the country. Beginning in 1987, the
year of the ratification of the new constitution and the increase in the minimum wage, the
total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors was at 436, and by 1992,
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the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors had decreased
dramatically to 136 (Figure 4.2 van der Velden 2018).
Figure 4.1: Disposable Income Inequality (the Philippines)
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Figure: 4.2: Total Number of Strikes and Lockouts (the Philippines)
700
600

581

500

436

400
267

300

197

200

183

182
136

100
0
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

Source: van der Velden 2018
However, despite this decline in the overall level of labor conflict in the form of strikes
and lockouts in the country, state violence that is indicative of state terrorism did rise in
the country. In 1987, the year of the ratification of the new constitution and the increase
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in the minimum wage, the level of political terror, which is indicative of state terrorism,
was at a level of 3, then increased to a level of 4 in 1988, and remained at a level of 4
until 1992, the year President Aquino left office (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019). There
was no variation in the frequency of human rights violations from 1987 through 1988
(although there was slight variation in their frequency throughout the remainder of
President Aquino’s term), which are also indicative of state terrorism. From 1987
through 1989, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture
were all at a frequency of “frequently” (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Only one
type of human rights violation, disappearances, decreased to a frequency of “not at all,”
and this occurred in only one of the years during President Aquino’s term, the year 1990
(Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
Figure 4.3: PTS Amnesty International (the Philippines)
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Victims of violence perpetrated by state agents and their proxies were largely
trade unionists, peasants, and their allies throughout 1987 and 1988. According to
Amnesty International, in 1987, “[o]ver 100 left-wing political activists and members of
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left-wing trade unions and peasant organizations were killed by the security forces,
paramilitary units under their command, or civilian ‘vigilante’ groups operating with
government support. Several ‘disappeared’ in custody” (Amnesty International, Report
Year 1988, 176). Extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political
imprisonment continued to be carried out by state agents and their proxies against these
groups into 1988. Amnesty International reports: “Victims [of extrajudicial killings and
disappearances] included suspected rebels, left-wing activists and church, trade union and
human rights activists. There were reports of torture of detainees and some prisoners
claimed they had been imprisoned on criminal charges for political reasons” (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1989, 194).
Unequal Collective Labor Rights and State Violence
The draft charter for the new constitution (and later the 1987 Constitution) also
contains several provisions pertaining to collective labor rights. A first provision asserts
that the state will take an active role in the protection of workers and the promotion of
their well-being. It states: “The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (1987 Philippine Const. art.
2. sec. 18.). A second provision, contained within the Bill of Rights, guarantees workers
the right to establish unions. It states: “The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged” (1987 Philippine Const. art. 3. sec. 8.). A third
provision guarantees the right of workers to organize and engage in collective action to
achieve their goals, as well as ensuring their right to adequate pay and work conditions
and a role in decision-making that impacts these rights. It states:
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[The State] shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law (1987 Philippine Const.
art. 13. sec. 3.).

The draft charter for the new constitution failed the expectations of certain labor
unions and peasant groups, despite the provisions included pertaining to collective labor
rights. Militant labor unions, such as those associated with the KMU, and radical peasant
groups and rural workers, such as those belonging to the KMP, opposed ratification of the
draft charter (Goodno 1991, 121). However, legal left-wing alliances like Bayan and its
associated political party, the PNB (People’s Party), were less firm in their opposition to
ratification, vacillating between opposition and critical acceptance (Goodno 1991, 121).
The CPP continued to remain resolute in its opposition to the draft charter’s ratification
(Goodno 1991, 121). Prior to the completion of the draft charter, President Aquino had
indicated that her government might take a more pro-labor stance than previous
governments had taken. In 1986, President Aquino appointed left-leaning politician
Augusto “Bobbit” Sanchez as Minister of Labor, whose initial steps in the position led
many militant unionists to believe the government would not be anti-labor (Rocamora
1992, 636). However, President Aquino’s approach to organized labor increasingly
shifted to the right. Sanchez was eventually fired and his successor as Minister of Labor
halted the process of dismantling the repressive labor laws that were established under
the Marcos dictatorship (Rocamora 1992, 637). And by October 1987, roughly eight
months after the plebiscite for the ratification of the draft charter in early February,
President Aquino was outlining her new labor policy in a speech before a crowd of
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cheering businesspeople while accusing militant workers of being stooges for the
communists (Rocamora 1992, 637). She declared to the crowd: “We will not allow an
unruly minority to use the rights of labor to achieve a communist victory instead”
(Rocamora 1992, 637). After leaving the cabinet, Sanchez noted his frustration with the
Aquino government, stating: “Like everybody else, I had a lot of expectations” (Goodno
1991, 115).
Despite the provisions included in the 1987 Constitution purportedly ensuring the
state’s role in protecting collective labor rights, the level of violations of overall
collective labor rights in 1992, the year President Aquino left office, were greater than in
1987, the year the new constitution was ratified (See Figure 4.2; Mosley 2011). While
there was a slight decrease in the level of these violations from a level of 10.5 in 1987 to
a level of 9.5 in 1988, it rose again to a level of 12 in 1989 and peaked at a level of 18 in
1990 before returning to a level of 12 by 1992 (Figure 4.4: Mosley 2011).
Figure 4.4: Violations of Overall Collective Labor Rights (the Philippines)
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Even as the degree of violations of overall collective labor rights increased
periodically throughout President Aquino’s term in office, there was no increase in the
overall level of labor conflict in the form of strikes and lockouts in the country. As these
violations began to rise from 1988 through 1989 and again through 1990, the total
number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors during this period steadily
decreased from 267 in 1988 to 197 in 1989 and again to 183 in 1990 (Figure 4.2: van der
Velden 2018). However, despite this decline in the overall level of labor conflict in the
form of strikes and lockouts in the country from 1988 through 1990, state violence that is
indicative of state terrorism continued at an exceptionally high level. In 1988, the first
year after the ratification of the new constitution in which the level of overall violations
of collective labor rights increased, the level of political terror, which is indicative of
state terrorism, was at a level of 4 and remained at this level throughout 1989 and 1990
(Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019). There was some variation in the frequency of human
rights violations from 1988 through 1990, which are also indicative of state terrorism.
Disappearances was at a frequency of “frequently” from 1988 through 1989, but then
dropped to a frequency of “not at all” in 1990 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
Torture was also at a frequency of “frequently” from 1988 through 1989, but then
dropped to a frequency of “occasionally” in 1990 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
Extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment had no variation between 1988 and
1990, with both maintaining a frequency of “frequently” during this period (Cingarelli,
Richards, and Clay 2014).
Victims of violence perpetrated by state agents and their proxies throughout 1987
and 1988 were largely trade unionists, peasants, and their allies. These victims were
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subjected to extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture.
This pattern continued into 1989 as well. Amnesty International reports:
More than 200 people, including human rights activists, church workers,
trade unionists and peasants, were killed in apparent extrajudicial
executions. Dozens of others reportedly ‘disappeared’…. Political
detainees were allegedly tortured under interrogation to extract
confessions (Amnesty International, Report Year 1990, 194).

Land Inequality and State Violence
The draft charter for the new constitution (and later the 1987 Constitution)
contains several provisions pertaining to land inequality. A first provision asserts that the
state will take an active role in the development of rural areas and the promotion of wideranging agrarian reform. It states: “The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform” (1987 Philippine Const. art. 2. sec. 21.). A second
provision asserts that the state will initiate an agrarian reform program that is based on
the rights of rural workers to own the land on which they work and the rights of other
farmworkers to receive an equitable share of what they produce. It states: “The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof” (1987
Philippine Const. art. 13. sec. 4.). A third provision asserts that the state will guarantee
that rural workers (individually and collectively), as well as landowners, have a role in
the decision-making processes pertaining to the agrarian reform program. It states: “The
State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as
cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program” (1987 Philippine Const. art. 13. sec. 5.).
89

A fourth provision asserts that the state has the authority to resettle rural workers on
state-owned agricultural lands. It states: “The State may resettle landless farmers and
farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the
manner provided by law” (1987 Philippine Const. art. 13. sec. 6.).
The draft charter for the new constitution failed the expectations of certain radical
peasant groups and rural workers, notably those belonging to the KMP, and they
ultimately opposed its ratification. However, on February 2, 1987, ratification of the
draft charter occurred with overwhelming support despite opposition from these groups
(Atienzo 2019, 10). After the 1987 Constitution went into effect, and despite the
provisions included in it purportedly ensuring the state’s role in promoting agrarian
reform, the level of land inequality continued to steadily rise after the ratification of the
draft charter. An initial drop in land inequality occurred from a level of 45.125 in 1987
to a level of 42 in 1988, but then rose again to a level of 43.1 in 1989, and continued to
steadily rise, reaching a level of 46.4 in 1992, the year President Aquino left office
(Figure 4.5: Landman and Larizza 2018). From 1987 through 1989, the number of
strikes and lockouts in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing
also decreased from 23 in 1987 to 8 in 1989 (Figure 4.6: van der Velden 2018).
However, the level of political terror, which is indicative of state terrorism, increased
from a level of 3 in 1987 to a level of 4 in 1988, and remained at a level of 4 until 1992,
the year President Aquino left office (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019). Human rights
violations including disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and
torture, which are also indicative of state terrorism, remained at a high frequency of
“frequently” from 1987 through 1989 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). A series of
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specific events may explain the rise in the level of political terror, which cannot be
explained by a broad surge in labor conflict in the country (represented by the total
Figure 4.5: Land Inequality (the Philippines)
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Figure 4.6: Number of Strikes in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (the Philippines)
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number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors or in one specific occupational
sector) because no surge ever occurred during the rise in the level of political terror from
1987 through 1988.
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The expectations of peasant groups and rural workers had been dashed by the
Aquino government prior to the ratification of the draft charter in February 1987,
specifically over the issue of agrarian reform, which, if genuinely implemented, would
address land inequality within the country. In 1986, the year Aquino became president,
she twice refused to meet with representatives of peasant groups who had marched on
Manila with demands for agrarian reform (Goodno 1991, 117). Later that year, on
October 21, peasants who had journeyed from faraway provinces attempted a march on
Malacanang Palace but were met with military troops who prevented them from doing so
(Goodno 1991, 117). To appease the peasants involved in this march, President Aquino
only offered them a single seat on the Constitutional Commission that would draft the
new constitution (Goodno 1991, 117). Increasingly suspicious of the new government
because of its indecisiveness on the issue and growing impatient, peasant groups and
rural workers under the KMP set up camps outside of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
building in Quezon City on January 15, 1987 to continue pressing for reform (Curaming
2013, 211). They went so far as to blockade the entrance to the building to prevent
employees from entering while hoisting their flag next to the Philippine flag, which was
considered to be a provocative act of protest (Curaming 2013, 211). In turn, the Aquino
government told the representatives of the peasants and rural workers that they would
have to wait for the ratification of the new constitution and the convening of Congress
(Curaming 2013, 211). The KMP, however, was unwilling to wait because they were
concerned that the landlord-dominated Congress would fail to enact comprehensive
agrarian reform (Curaming 2013, 211). On January 22, the peasant groups and rural
workers, led by KMP president Jaime Tadeo, marched from their camps toward
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Malacanag Palace to present their demands to President Aquino (Curaming 2013, 211).
Many of those sympathetic to their demands, including students, intellectuals, labor
unions, and the urban poor, joined the marchers, and the size of the crowd grew to an
estimated ten to fifteen thousand (Curaming 2013, 211-212). Aware that the marchers
would proceed across Mendiola Bridge, the police and the marines erected a blockade
and positioned crowd-control units on the bridge (Curaming 2013, 211). As the marchers
attempted to make their way across, they collided with the crowd-control units, and
clashes broke out between them (Curaming 2013, 211). Once the marchers succeeded in
breaching the blockade, they were met with gunfire from the crowd-control units, which
continued even after the marchers disengaged and retreated from the bridge (Curaming
2013, 212). Ultimately, twelve or thirteen people were killed immediately and over one
hundred were wounded, and the incident became popularly known as the Mendiola
Massacre (Curaming 2013, 212).
Prior to the massacre, the political wing of the CPP, the NDF (National
Democratic Front), had agreed to a ceasefire with the Aquino government that took effect
on December 10, 1986, which would allow the two entities to engage in peace
negotiations (Curaming 2013, 217). However, in response to the Mendiola Massacre in
January 1987, the NDF withdrew from the ceasefire and never again engaged in peace
negotiations with the Aquino government (Curaming 2013, 217). After the CPP
withdrew, it resumed its war against the government, and President Aquino ordered
counter-insurgency operations to resume in full force (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 237).
By 1988, these operations had contributed to the capture of important leaders involved in
the insurgency, a decrease in the size of its base, and an increasing demoralization and
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division within its ranks (Curaming 2013, 219). The years 1987 and 1988, when state-led
counter-insurgency operations resumed and made significant gains against the CPP
insurgency, are the same years in which the level of political terror increased within the
country, from a level of 3 in 1987 to a level of 4 in 1988 (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019).
This suggests that there is a relationship between the Aquino government’s renewed
counter-insurgency operations against the insurgency and the rise in political terror
within the country. This is evident in the Amnesty International Reports concerning the
years 1987 and 1988.
In 1987, extrajudicial killings in the country increased shortly after the NDF
withdrew from the ceasefire. Amnesty International reports:
The incidence of extrajudicial executions rose following the collapse in
January of talks between the government and the CPP-led NDF over how
to end the insurgency. The immediate cause of the collapse was an
incident on Mendiola Bridge in Manila on 22 January….The NDF
withdrew from negotiations and a cease-fire…was allowed to lapse on 7
February (Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 177).

Extrajudicial killings occurred three days after the lapse of the cease-fire and were carried
out by state agents against civilians during counter-insurgency operations. Amnesty
International reports: “Three days later, 17 villagers were killed by the Philippines
army…following an NPA ambush of an army patrol in which a lieutenant was killed.
The NPA fighters escaped, but soldiers then rounded up many villagers in their homes
and shot them. Among the dead were six children and a couple in their eighties”
(Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 177). State agents continued to engage in
extrajudicial killings of civilians during counter-insurgency operations for the next
several months. Amnesty International reports: “There were reports of similar killings by
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government forces in the following months. For example, in late April, seven noncombatants were alleged to have been extrajudicially executed by the 57th and 61st
Infantry Battalions during operations against the NPA” (Amnesty International, Report
Year 1988, 177).
In 1988, the year in which political terror increased to a level of 4 from a level of
3 in 1987, state agents continued to engage in extrajudicial killings and other human
rights violations, such as disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture, which
appears to have been directed at anyone they accused of belonging to or supporting the
communist insurgency. State agents routinely targeted members of the Basic Christian
Communities (BCC) with extrajudicial killings, accusing them of supporting the NPA
(Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 194). Concerning one incident, Amnesty
International reports:
In April Reynaldo de los Santos, an active member of the BCC’s justice
and peace committee in Himamaylan, and other human rights
organizations, was shot dead with his wife and three children aged six to
fourteen at their home….The attack occurred after local soldiers
apparently accused Reynaldo de los Santos and his family of supporting
the NPA (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 195).

State agents also carried out disappearances of those they accused of supporting the
communist insurgency, including dozens of farmers taken into custody by soldiers during
counter-insurgency operations against the NPA (Amnesty International 1989, 195).
Concerning one such incident, Amnesty International reports: “Eleven farmers active in
the militant Small Farmers’ Association of Negros ‘disappeared’…in March. Villagers
reported that they were arrested by members of the 332nd PC company….At the end of
the year the 11 farmers were still missing” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989,
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195). State agents engaged in the political imprisonment of those they accused of
belonging to or supporting the communist insurgency. Amnesty International reports:
“Others imprisoned under criminal charges accused of involvement in or support for the
NPA, alleged that the charges against them were politically motivated and that they were
being held for non-violent activities in legal left-wing associations” (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1989, 196). State agents also committed torture against those
they accused of belonging to or supporting the communist insurgency, including several
prisoners held in major military intelligence commands, alleged to have prominent roles
in the NPA and/or CPP (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 195). Concerning
three of these prisoners, Epidio Latorilla, Valeriano Alvarando, and Anastacio Cortez,
Amnesty International reports: “They alleged that during this time they were nearly
suffocated with water and plastic bags, repeatedly and severely beaten and kicked, forced
to lie on ice, had metal objects inserted into the anus, were burned with cigarettes, and
subjected to mock executions” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 195-196).
This study concludes that the human rights violations committed against those
accused by state agents of belonging to or supporting the communist insurgency from
1987 through 1988, which includes extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political
imprisonment, and torture, constitute acts of state terrorism and perform a specific
political function. How this conclusion was drawn is discussed in greater detail in the
analysis contained within Chapter 5.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter begins with an analysis of the examples of state violence discussed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to determine through context-specific evidence whether they
constitute acts of state terrorism. It then discusses whether the proposed hypotheses were
either challenged or upheld by the case studies, ultimately concluding that land inequality
is likely a main driver of state terrorism in both the Brazilian case and the Philippine
case. This finding is then applied to the proposed theory of class structure and state
terrorism to demonstrate the connection between land inequality and state terrorism that
is shared by both cases. This chapter then provides potential explanations for why the
state likely uses terrorism as opposed to other tactics by examining the examples of state
terrorism found in each case and determining how terrorism has lower production and
response costs than alternative strategies. It then concludes with a discussion of the
limitations of the scope of this study and connects the findings to a broader historical
trajectory.
State Violence as State Terrorism
Through the analysis of context-specific evidence, as suggested by Blakeley
(2010, chap. 1), acts of violence can examined to determine whether they constitute state
terrorism. This is accomplished by determining the agency and motive of the state in the
perpetrated violence. It can be concluded that the instances of violence highlighted in the
Brazilian case clearly constitute state terrorism. In the occurrences of extrajudicial
killings of peasants and their advisers in 1987 by gunmen and private security personnel

97

hired by local landowners, it can be concluded that the state was likely complicit in the
violence because state authorities failed to investigate the killings and arrest suspected
perpetrators. Amnesty International reports that “between 1980 and 1987 no landowner
or pistoleiro was convicted of the murder of a peasant” (Amnesty International, Report
Year 1988, 98). In these instances, it can also be concluded that the likely motive behind
the killings was not only to eliminate the political opponents of landowners, but also to
intimidate other potential opponents because, as Amnesty International reports, “such
crimes had become more flagrant and deliberate and were openly carried out” (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1988, 98).
In the occurrence of the political imprisonment and torture of five peasants
arrested by police in Para state in 1987, along with a sixth man held with them who had
been arrested in Goias state, it can be concluded that the state was likely complicit. First,
police flagrantly violated police procedures in the arrests as stipulated by the Brazilian
Constitution. Amnesty International reports: “The Brazilian Constitution stipulates that
arrest may be made only when the accused is caught in flagrante delictu or when a
warrant or judicial order from the competent authority has been issued. Neither of these
applied in this case” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 97). This suggests that
police agents were not concerned about facing potential prosecution by state authorities
for violation of constitutionally stipulated procedures, which implies state condonation of
the violations. Second, after the allegations of torture were alleged by the six prisoners,
they were, as Amnesty International reports, “denied access to lawyers and were not
allowed medical examinations until some 30 to 40 days later” (Amnesty International,
Report Year 1988, 97). This suggests that state authorities were likely more concerned
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with covering up the alleged torture, than investigating the allegations and prosecuting
potential perpetrators, which implies state complicity. While the six prisoners involved
in this example ultimately escaped from police custody, the motive behind the torture and
release of political prisoners can be concluded to likely be the intimidation of others, who
upon hearing of the torture from the victims, will be deterred from taking part in the type
of political activities engaged in by the victims.
In the instances of extrajudicial killings of rural workers’ leaders and their allies
in 1988 who were involved in land disputes, it can be concluded that the state was likely
complicit in the violence. Regarding the killing of Francisco Domingos Ramos,
President of the Rural Workers Trade Union of Pancas, Espirito Santo state, who was
shot by a gunman after an attempt to get death threats made toward him by a landowner
investigated, state authorities failed to prosecute the landowner and alleged gunmen,
which implies state complicity. Amnesty International reports: “Three police officers
were later indicted for his murder but charges against the landowner and an alleged
gunman were dropped” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109). Concerning the
killing of Francisco Alves Mendes Filho, the President of the Rural Workers Trade Union
of Xapuri, Acre state, who had appealed to state authorities to arrest the individuals he
believed had made six previous attempts on his life, state authorities failed to arrest them
despite these allegations and warrants issued for their arrests. Amnesty International
reports: “Although these individuals had been convicted of previous murders, police
repeatedly failed to enforce arrest warrants against them, and allowed them to move
about the region freely” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109). However, after
the killing of Mendes, these individuals were charged with his murder. The failure of
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state authorities to arrest these individuals despite arrest warrants against them implies
state complicity in the killing, and the subsequent arrest of the individuals after the killing
suggests that state authorities were trying to obscure their involvement, perhaps because
of the high profile of the victim, who was the president of a trade union. Regarding the
killing of Joao Batista, a land rights lawyer and Socialist Party representative in the
Legislative Assembly in Para state, who was shot in front of his family after telling the
assembly two military police officers threatened him, state authorities failed to follow
simple investigative procedures into his death. Amnesty International reports: “By the
end of December the police had failed to obtain a full statement from his widow – the
principal witness to his killing – despite her efforts to provide an account of the events”
(Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 109). This suggests an unwillingness of state
authorities to fully investigate the murder and prosecute potential perpetrators, which
implies state complicity in the crime. It can be concluded that the likely motive behind
the extrajudicial killings of Ramos, Mendes, and Batista was not only to eliminate the
political opponents of landowners, but also to intimidate other potential political
opponents because of the high visibility of the three victims, with two being rural trade
union presidents and one being a representative in a state legislative assembly.
Through the analysis of context-specific evidence, it can be concluded that the
examples of violence highlighted in the case of the Philippines also clearly constitute
state terrorism. In the example of the extrajudicial killings of 17 villagers by government
soldiers during counter-insurgency operations against the NPA in 1987, it can be
concluded that the state likely condoned the killing of these non-combatants because a
pattern in which government forces continued to murder non-combatants emerged after
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this occurrence, suggesting that the state was not concerned about stopping these killings.
Amnesty International reports: “There were reports of similar killings by government
forces in the following months” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1988, 177). In the
specific instance of the massacre of the 17 villagers, it can also be concluded that the
likely motive behind the killings was primarily to intimidate other villagers because
children and the elderly were among the victims. Amnesty International reports:
“Among the dead were six children and a couple in their eighties” (Amnesty
International, Report Year 1988, 177). The extreme ruthlessness of killing children and
the elderly, which serves no direct military purpose, suggests that the likely motive
behind the killings was primarily to instill fear in other villagers who may potentially
support the NPA.
The pattern of government forces extrajudicially killing non-combatants
continued into 1988 as well. In the example of the extrajudicial killings of BCC
members Reynaldo de los Santos and his family, including three children, by government
soldiers for being suspected of supporting the NPA, it can be concluded that the state
likely condoned these killings because the local military command attempted to excuse
the actions of the soldiers by claiming they had encountered armed resistance. Amnesty
International reports: “Following the deaths the Negros military command announced
that there had been an armed encounter between the NPA and army Scout Rangers in
which three rebels and one child had been killed” (Amnesty International, Report Year
1989, 195). This account, though, was contradicted by other witnesses to the incident.
Amnesty International reports that “the sole survivor of the de los Santos family, together
with other witnesses, stated that the family had been alone in their home when soldiers
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attacked them with automatic rifles and grenades” (Amnesty International, Report Year
1989, 195). In this instance, it can be concluded that the likely motive behind the killings
was not merely to eliminate suspected NPA supporters. The sensational nature and
extreme ruthlessness of attacking a home with automatic rifles and grenades, which
contains children, suggests that the likely motive behind the killings was to instill fear
into witnesses in order to deter them from potentially supporting the NPA.
There was also a pattern of government forces disappearing individuals suspected
of supporting the communist insurgency throughout 1988, including dozens of farmers.
In the example of the disappearance of 11 farmers active in the Small Farmers’
Association of Negros by members of the 332nd PC company, it can be concluded that
the state likely condoned these actions because it failed to thoroughly investigate their
disappearances. Amnesty International reports: “A government team investigating the
‘disappearances’ in July was told by a local official that he saw the 11 farmers being
taken away by men in military uniform but the investigators failed to visit the village to
collect statements by relatives or other witnesses” (Amnesty International, Report Year
1989, 195). In this instance, it can also be concluded that the likely motive behind the
disappearances was not merely to eliminate supporters of the NPA but was also to deter
other potential supporters of the NPA because the arrests of the farmers prior to their
disappearance was carried out in front of multiple witnesses. Amnesty International
reports: “Villagers reported that [the farmers] were arrested by members of the 332nd PC
company who told relatives that the 11 would be sent home after questioning, but the
company later denied having made any arrests” (Amnesty International, Report Year
1989, 195).
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A pattern of government forces engaging in political imprisonment and torture
was present during 1988 as well. In the occurrence of the political imprisonment and
torture of Elpidio Latorilla, Valeriano Alvarando, and Anastacio Cortez, three prisoners
accused of prominent roles in the CPP, it can be concluded that the state likely condoned
these actions because the state made no effort to publicly acknowledge the results of any
official investigations, which implies an attempt by the state to cover up the alleged
abuses. Amnesty International reports: “The outcome of any official investigation into
these allegations was not known” (Amnesty International, Report Year 1989, 196). In
this instance, it can also be concluded that the likely motive behind the political
imprisonment and torture of these three individuals was not merely to apprehend
suspected insurgents and extract intelligence. It was also likely carried out in order to
intimidate other potential insurgents because of the extreme ruthlessness and degrading
nature of the torture practices, which, according to Amnesty International, included
“metal objects inserted into the anus” and “mock executions” (Amnesty International,
Report Year 1989, 195-196).
Hypothesis One: Income Inequality and State Terrorism
The first hypothesis states: After government initiatives to address income
inequality lead to little decrease in income inequality, the failed expectations of workers
and peasants is likely to lead to an increase in labor conflict and/or armed conflict, and
this is likely to lead to an increase in state terrorism. Certain parts of this hypothesis
appear to be upheld by the Brazilian case, while some aspects appear to be challenged by
it. Disposable income inequality continued to steadily rise in the country (Figure 3.1:
Solt 2019). The Sarney government’s efforts to address income inequality did fail the
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expectations of many workers. There was also a surge in labor conflict represented by
the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors from 1985 through
1987, with the vast majority of these strikes carried out by urban workers (Figure 3.2 van
der Velden 2018). The prime motivating factors behind this surge in labor conflict were
issues of wage restitution, which suggests a broad connection to income inequality. The
level of political terror also did increase during this period, specifically in 1987 (Figure
3.3 Gibney et al. 2019), along with the frequency of extrajudicial killings and political
imprisonment, while the frequency of torture decreased slightly, and the frequency of
disappearances remained unchanged (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). These
indicators suggest that state terrorism did increase. Despite the level of disposable
income inequality, the level of labor conflict represented by the total number of strikes
and lockouts in all occupational sectors, and the level of political terror and the frequency
of certain human rights violations all increasing from 1985 through 1987, state violence
during this period was not directed specifically at urban workers, the majority of whom
were participating in the strike surge, which suggests that state terrorism was not
deployed because of this surge.
The first hypothesis appears to be challenged by the Philippine case. Disposable
income continued to steadily rise in the country (Figure 4.1: Solt 2019). The Aquino
governments efforts to address income inequality did fail the expectations of some, but
many remained supportive of her government. But rather than a surge of labor conflict in
response to rising disposable income inequality occurring like in the Brazil case, labor
conflict represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors
continued to decline (Figure 4.2: van der Velden 2018). However, despite this decline in
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labor conflict, the level of political terror did increase, specifically from 1987 to 1988
(Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019), while extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment,
torture, and disappearances all remained at the same high frequency from 1987 through
1989 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). These indicators suggest that state terrorism
did increase. Despite the degree of disposable income continuing to rise, the level of
labor conflict as represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts in all
occupational sectors continued to decline, notably during the rise in the level of political
terror from 1987 to 1988 with trade unionists, peasants, and their allies the victims of
state violence, which suggests that state terrorism was not utilized because of increasing
labor conflict in the form of strikes and/or lockouts.
Hypothesis Two: Unequal Collective Labor Rights and State Terrorism
The second hypothesis states: After government initiatives to address unequal
collective labor rights lead to little decrease in unequal collective labor rights, the failed
expectations of workers and peasants is likely to lead to an increase in labor conflict
and/or armed conflict, and this is likely to lead to an increase in state terrorism. Certain
aspects of this hypothesis seem to be upheld by the Brazilian case, while some parts
appear to be challenged by it. Violations of overall collective labor rights rose for much
of this period, specifically from 1986 through 1989 (Figure 3.5: Mosley 2011). The
Sarney government’s efforts to address unequal collective labor rights did fail the
expectations of many unionists. There was also a surge in labor conflict represented by
the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors from 1985 through
1987, with the vast majority of these strikes carried out by urban workers (Figure 3.2: van
der Velden). While the prime motivating factors behind this surge in labor conflict were

105

issues of wage restitution, suggesting a broad connection to income inequality, other
issues concerning collective labor rights were contributing factors. The level of political
terror also did rise during this period, specifically in 1987 (Figure 3.3: Gibney et al.
2019), along with the frequency of extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment,
while the frequency of torture fell somewhat, and the frequency of disappearances
remained unchanged (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). These indicators suggest that
state terrorism did increase. Despite the level of violations of overall collective labor
rights, the level of labor conflict represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts
in all occupational sectors, and the level of political terror and the frequency of certain
human rights violations all increasing from 1985 through 1987, state violence did not
specifically target urban workers, the majority of whom were participating in the strike
surge, which suggests that state terrorism was not used as a result of this surge.
The second hypothesis seems to be challenged by the Philippine case. Violations
of overall collective labor rights increased periodically in the country (Figure 4.4: Mosley
2011). The Aquino government’s efforts to address unequal collective labor rights did
fail the expectations of militant unionists and peasants. But rather than a surge in labor
conflict in response to increases in violations of collective labor rights taking place like in
the Brazilian case, labor conflict represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts
in all occupational sectors continued to drop (Figure 4.2: van der Velden 2018).
However, despite this decrease in labor conflict, the level of political terror did rise,
specifically from 1987 to 1988 (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019), while extrajudicial
killings, political imprisonment, torture and disappearances all continued to be at the
same high frequency from 1987 to 1988 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). These
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indicators suggest that state terrorism did increase. Despite the level of violations of
overall collective labor rights periodically increasing, the level of labor conflict as
represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts in all occupational sectors
continued to decrease, notably during the increase in the level of political terror from
1987 to 1988 with trade unionists, peasants, and their allies the victims of state violence,
which suggests that state terrorism was not employed because of increasing labor conflict
in the form of strikes and/or lockouts.
Hypothesis Three: Land Inequality and State Terrorism
The third hypothesis states: After government initiatives to address land
inequality lead to little decrease in land inequality, the failed expectations of workers and
peasants is likely to lead to an increase in labor conflict and/or armed conflict, and this is
likely to lead to an increase in state terrorism. This hypothesis appears to be upheld by
the Brazilian case. Land inequality did decrease during this period from 1985 through
1988, but it never decreased significantly (only .375 percent); it then plateaued at the
1988 level through 1990 (Figure 3.6: Landman and Larizza 2018). The Sarney
government’s efforts to address land inequality did fail the expectations of rural workers’
groups and peasants in the MST. Despite the small decrease in land inequality, there
were intensified land invasions and occupations by displaced peasants of the MST,
beginning in approximately 1987 (Robles 2018, 8). There was also a surge in labor
conflict, specifically in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing,
from 1986 through 1988 (Figure 3.4: van der Velden 2018). The level of political terror
also did increase during this surge in labor conflict, specifically from 1987 through 1988
(Figure 3.3: Gibney et al. 2019), along with the frequency of torture, while the frequency
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of extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment decreased, and the frequency of
disappearances remained unchanged (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). These
indicators suggest that state terrorism did increase. While the level of land inequality
decreased (albeit not significantly), the level of labor conflict as represented by the total
number of strikes in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing did
increase, and so did the level of political terror and one type of human rights violation
from 1987 through 1988. During this period, state violence was directed specifically at
rural workers, peasants and their allies, which suggests that state terrorism was utilized
because of the increase in labor conflict in the rural occupational sector of agriculture,
forestry, and fishing and the intensified land invasions and occupations.
Certain parts of the third hypothesis appear to be upheld by the Philippine case,
while some aspects seem to be challenged by it. After an initial drop from 1986 through
1988, land inequality continued to steadily rise after 1988 through 1992 (Figure 4.5:
Landman and Larizza 2018). The Aquino government’s efforts to address land inequality
did fail the expectations of militant unionists and radical peasants. But rather than a
surge of labor conflict in response to rising land inequality happening like in the Brazilian
case, labor conflict represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts in the rural
occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing decreased from 1987 through
1989, rose again in 1990, and then declined through 1992 (Figure 4.6: van der Velden
2018). However, despite this decrease in labor conflict, the level of political terror did
increase, specifically from 1987 to 1988 (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019), while
extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, torture, and disappearances all remained at
the same high frequency from 1987 through 1988 (Cingarelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).
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These indicators suggest that state terrorism did increase. Despite the level of land
inequality continuing to increase (after an initial decrease), the level of labor conflict as
represented by the total number of strikes and lockouts in the rural occupational sector of
agriculture, forestry, and fishing trended downward, notably declining during the increase
in the level of political terror from 1987 through 1988 with trade unionists, peasants, and
their allies the victims of state violence, which suggests that state terrorism was not
utilized because of increasing labor conflict in the rural occupational sector of
agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Rather, a series of specific events suggests an
explanation for the use of state terrorism: Pro-agrarian reform demonstrations carried out
by peasant organizations led to a violent response by state agents, resulting in the NDF
withdrawal from the ceasefire with the Aquino government, which, in turn led the
government to resume counter-insurgency operations against the CPP-led insurgency.
Land Inequality: Main Driver of State Terrorism
Both the case of Brazil and the case of the Philippines suggest that the unequal
possession of productive resources (as represented by the land inequality
concept/variable) is the dimension of exploitation most likely to produce class struggle
that will prompt the state to respond with terrorism. In the Brazilian case, land inequality
did decrease, but it never decreased significantly (only .375 percent from 1985 through
1988) and plateaued at an exceptionally high level throughout the remainder of the period
included in this study (Figure 3.6: Landman and Larizza 2018). The efforts to address
land inequality by the Sarney government failed the expectations of rural workers’ groups
and peasants in the MST. The class struggle that emerged over land issues, such as
intensified land invasions and occupations by displaced peasants of the MST, beginning
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in approximately 1987 (Robles 2018, 8), and a strike surge by rural laborers in the rural
occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing from 1986 through 1988 (Figure
3.4: van der Velden 2018) aligns with a rise in state terrorism from 1987 through 1988
(Figure 3.3: Gibney et al. 2019). The victims of state terrorism during this period were
largely rural workers, peasants, and their allies, which indicates that the class struggle
engaged in by rural workers, peasants, and their allies over issues broadly connected to
land inequality was likely the primary reason for the increased use of terrorism by the
state.
While in the Philippine case land inequality initially decreased from 1986 through
1988, it began to rise again in 1989 and continued to increase throughout the remainder
of the period included in this study (Figure 4.5: Landman and Larizza 2018). However,
class struggle in the form of labor conflict, represented by the total number of strikes and
lockouts in the rural occupational sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Figure 4.6:
van der Velden 2018) trended downward for the entire period, notably during the increase
in state terrorism from 1987 through 1988 (Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019). This
downward trend, though, should not lead one to believe that rural workers and peasants
were acquiescent in the face of high levels of land inequality. Class struggle in the
Philippines was not expressed by rural workers and peasants through an increase in labor
conflict in the form of strikes, as in the Brazilian case, but rather through armed conflict,
specifically through the well-established CPP-led insurgency. Born in 1968, the CPP’s
armed wing, the NPA, was the result of a union between urban Marxist ideologues, who
provided sophisticated organizational skills, and a small peasant rebel faction, who
provided the manpower and skills for guerilla warfare (Bacho 1987, 262). Between the
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ousting of Marcos and the end of 1987, NPA forces had increased 25 percent to 25,000
regulars (Kowalewski 1990, 247). Many of those attracted to the NPA cause to
overthrow the Philippine government were peasants and others in socio-economic
distress. Based on interviews with 101 NPA guerillas, “almost three-quarters of its
members were peasants (45 percent) or unemployed (29 percent) from communities felt
to be in economic (89 percent) and political (87 percent) crisis with tense (68 percent) or
mixed tense-harmonious (20 percent) relations with the military” (Kowalewski 1990,
247). The founder of the CPP, Jose Maria Sison, wrote that if there had been “genuine
land reform” carried out in the Philippines, the CPP would not have “found the ground so
fertile for armed revolution” (Kessler 1989, 48). While the absence of genuine land
reform was a prime motivating factor for peasants to join the CPP-led insurgency, other
social disputes contributed to their recruitment as well (Kessler 1989, 48). More broadly,
elites never made any attempts to undertake structural reforms that would integrate
peasants into society, which would give them a greater share of the wealth and power
possessed by elites (Kessler 1989, 48-49). Thus, issues over land inequality and other
class-based grievances driving the recruitment of peasants and others from the working
class give the CPP-led insurgency the character of class struggle, which is expressed in
this case through armed conflict. The increase in state terrorism from 1987 through 1988
(Figure 4.3: Gibney et al. 2019) aligns with the peasant-initiated demonstration and
subsequent Mendiola Massacre of 1987, as well as the NDF withdrawal from the
ceasefire in 1987 and increased government counter-insurgency operations between 1987
and 1988 that targeted largely rural workers, peasants, their allies, and anyone accused of
belonging to or supporting the CPP/NPA. This indicates that the class struggle engaged
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in by the CPP/NPA (evident by the large number of peasants among its ranks) over classbased issues, with one of the more prominent of these issues being land inequality, was
likely the primary reason for the increased utilization of terrorism by the state.
The empirical findings from each case contained in this study suggest more
broadly that state terrorism may be applied more often in the sphere of agricultural
production than other spheres of production. This may be because terrorism has
potentially lower production and response costs than alternative strategies within the
sphere of agricultural production. These findings are applied to the proposed theory of
class structure and state terrorism. Potential explanations for why the state likely uses
terrorism rather than alternative strategies are then provided.
In both the case of Brazil and the case of the Philippines, it can be concluded that
when the strategies and institutional devices of domination within the labor process of
agricultural production (e.g., bossing, surveillance, threats, etc.) fail to contain and
suppress outbreaks of labor insubordination, and this labor insubordination becomes
expressed through class struggle in the form of labor conflict and/or armed conflict, the
state acting on behalf of capitalists as a whole, uses terrorism as a means of domination
outside the labor process of agricultural production, targeting primarily activist rural
workers and peasants, and in some instances extending this violence to the wider society
(notably in the Philippine case in which anyone suspected of belonging to or supporting
the CPP/NPA might be targeted). The state, which has leadership positions filled by
individuals from the landholding fraction of the capitalist class (evident in the socioeconomic status of President Sarney and President Aquino as landholding elites),
suggests that the larger motive behind the state’s use of terrorism is to intimidate activist
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rural workers and peasants, as well as potential allies within the other classes, in order to
preserve the economic status quo (i.e., the unaltered and uninterrupted appropriation of
the labor effort of rural workers and control over key productive resources, specifically
land and all it contains), which is beneficial to the landholding fraction of the capitalist
class, and by extension, the state.
In the Brazilian case, the state likely uses terrorism in reaction to the class
struggle engaged in by rural workers, peasants, and their allies because the response costs
are lower than other strategies that might be used to dominate them. For example, largescale military or police operations, which could involve high numbers of personnel
employing repressive tactics, would be highly visible to the public and easily
recognizable as state-directed actions. This could potentially, in turn, impose retributive
costs on the state as a response to these actions. Rural workers and peasants, along with
other offended or sympathetic bystanders, might be more willing to seek future retaliation
against state agents or property, and even more threatening to the state, organize into an
active resistance. These retributive costs can be diminished through the use of terrorism.
For example, by enabling the assassinations carried out by gunmen and private security
personnel in the employ of landowners (e.g., not enforcing arrest warrants and failing to
investigate the crimes), the state is able to maintain plausible deniability in these actions,
allowing it to accomplish state objectives while mitigating the response costs that might
be imposed as the result of more visible actions. The state also likely utilizes terrorism in
reaction to the class conflict engaged in by rural workers, peasants, and their allies
because the production costs are lower than other strategies that might be used to
dominate them. Large-scale military and police operations, while highly visible, are also
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more expensive to carry out than terrorist operations. For example, the expense of hiring
a few gunmen and private security personnel is likely far less expensive than mobilizing
high numbers of military and police personnel who would require multiple transport
vehicles. In addition, the assassins’ fee is incurred by the landowner, further mitigating
production costs for the state. Production costs in the form of self-imposed normative or
moral constraints are also likely to be reduced substantially for state agents or their
proxies who engage in terrorist actions because of the likely presence of both the
militaristic-state and ideological-mission syndromes in Brazil. The militaristic-state
syndrome is likely to still be present because of Brazil’s recent history under a military
dictatorship, and the ideological-mission syndrome is likely to still be present because of
the military dictatorship’s strongly perceived ideological mission to destroy communism.
The combination of the cultural glorification of violence associated with the former
syndrome and the interpretation of target groups as inferior peoples associated with the
latter syndrome is likely to greatly reduce the normative and moral constraints on
employing terrorism against these groups (in this case rural workers, peasants, and allies,
whose aspirations of agrarian reform can easily be conflated with communism).
In the Philippine case, the state likely uses terrorism in reaction to the class
struggle engaged in by rural workers, peasants, and their allies, as well as anyone accused
of belonging to or supporting the CPP/NPA, because the response costs are lower than
other strategies that might be used to dominate them. For example, large-scale military
operations to destroy villages that potentially act as a base of support for the NPA would
be highly visible to the international community and could be perceived by international
actors (e.g., other more powerful states, potential private investors in the Philippines, etc.)
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as morally offensive and/or indicative of an unstable investment environment.
International actors could potentially, in turn, impose punitive costs on the state as a
response to these actions. More powerful states might be willing to impose economic
sanctions on the Philippines, while potential investors might be unwilling to invest capital
in the country. These punitive costs can be avoided through the use of terrorism. For
example, by disappearing activist farmers and then sending a government team to
conduct an investigation into the disappearances (which might intentionally fail), the state
is able to make the incident appear as an aberration in state practices because of the
state’s ostensible willingness to bring the perpetrators to justice. It can, therefore,
accomplish state objectives while mitigating the response costs that may be imposed if it
did not conduct an investigation, or alternately, if it conducted a large-scale, highly
visible military operation in lieu of the less visible disappearances. The state also likely
utilizes terrorism in reaction to the class struggle engaged in by rural workers, peasants,
and their allies, as well as anyone suspected of belonging to or supporting the CPP/NPA,
because the production costs are lower than other strategies that might be used to
dominate them. While large-scale military operations are employed against NPA
guerillas, which require a larger force to overwhelm because they are armed, smaller lessexpensive terrorist operations are employed against unarmed, and therefore, less
threatening opponents. For example, only a small contingent of soldiers is necessary to
attack the home of a husband and wife with small children accused of being NPA
supporters, rather than relying on a larger military force that is more expensive to
mobilize. Production costs in the form of self-imposed normative or moral constraints
are also likely to be reduced to a great degree for state agents or their proxies who carry
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out terrorist operations because of the likely presence of both the militaristic-state and
ideological-mission syndromes in the Philippines. The militaristic-state syndrome is
likely to be present because of the influential nature of the military in national politics,
evident in multiple coup attempts, although it is likely to be less pronounced than in the
Brazil case because there was never an established military dictatorship. The ideologicalmission syndrome, however, is likely to be more pronounced in the Philippine case
because of the long-running communist insurgency. The Brazilian state easily defeated a
relatively weak leftist guerilla movement under the military dictatorship, which never
gained widespread support among the population like the insurgency in the Philippines.
The combination of the cultural glorification of violence associated with the militaristicstate syndrome and the interpretation of the target groups as inferior peoples associated
with the ideological-mission syndrome is likely to substantially reduce the normative and
moral constraints on using terrorism against these groups (in this case rural workers,
peasants, and their allies, as well as anyone suspected of belonging to or supporting the
CPP/NPA).
Scope Limitations
There are several limitations to the scope of this study on class structure and state
terrorism. First, it does not take into consideration the impact of the global class structure
on state terrorism within Brazil and the Philippines, specifically regarding the external
support for state terrorism provided to each capitalist state by more powerful capitalist
states in an effort to shore up the class interests of a transnational capitalist class. The
financial support and training provided by the US to strengthen the repressive apparatus
of each state during their respective authoritarian periods suggests that the US likely
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provided instruction on counter-insurgency and police tactics that meet the definitional
criteria of terrorism and that this continued to have an impact on the state violence
perpetrated in each country during regime transition. Second, this study does not fully
examine the connection between paramilitaries and state terrorism. Paramilitaries played
a prominent role in the terrorism perpetrated against the populations of Brazil and the
Philippines during their respective authoritarian periods, and their deployment by the
state to meet state objectives continued throughout regime transition. Third, this study
does not provide measures for the number of occurrences of land conflicts, land invasions
and occupations, and worker/peasant demonstrations. These could also be understood as
expressions of class struggle that would potentially have an impact on state terrorism,
which is evident in the Philippines case regarding the massive peasant-initiated
demonstration that resulted in the Mendiola Massacre and the renewal of violence
between the Aquino government and the CPP/NPA.
Conclusion
This study finds that land inequality is likely a main driver of state terrorism. In
the case of Brazil (1985-1990), the Sarney government’s initiatives to address land
inequality failed the expectations of rural workers’ groups and peasants in the MST,
likely leading peasants to intensify land invasions and occupations in approximately 1987
and rural workers to increase strikes from 1986 through 1988. These occurrences of class
struggle align with the increase in state terrorism from 1987 through 1988 in which
victims of state violence were largely rural workers, peasants, and their allies. This
indicates that the class struggle engaged in by rural workers, peasants, and their allies
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over issues broadly connected to land inequality was likely the primary reason for the
increased use of terrorism by the state.
In the case of the Philippines (1986-1992), the Aquino government’s initiatives to
address land inequality failed the expectations of militant unionists and radical peasants,
likely leading them to engage in the peasant-initiated demonstration of 1987 that resulted
in the subsequent Mendiola Massacre and the withdrawal of the NDF from the ceasefire
in 1987. This instance of class struggle aligns with the increased counter-insurgency
operations of the government between 1987 and 1988 and the increase in state terrorism
from 1987 through 1988 that largely targeted rural workers, peasants, their allies, and
anyone accused of belonging to or supporting the CPP/NPA. This indicates that the class
struggle engaged in by the CPP/NPA (evident by the large number of peasants among its
ranks) over class-based issues, with one of the more prominent of these issues being land
inequality, was likely the primary reason for the increased use of terrorism by the state.
In both Brazil and the Philippines, terrorism was consistently utilized by the state
and its proxies throughout their respective authoritarian periods and regime transitions.
This suggests that the political regime in power may have less impact than class structure
on whether the state will use terrorism against its citizenry as an instrument of internal
governance. In both countries, throughout their respective authoritarian periods and
regime transitions, workers, peasants, and anyone attempting to change the socioeconomic conditions of workers and peasants were overwhelmingly the targets of this
violence. This suggests that the state likely employs terrorism against the working and
peasant classes as a means of class domination to prevent them from challenging the
structures of exploitation imposed on them by the capitalist class through the state, thus
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giving state terrorism the character of class warfare. While the two cases contained in
this study suggest that land inequality (or more broadly, the unequal possession of
productive resources) is the dimension of exploitation most likely to produce class
struggle that will prompt the state to respond with terrorism, it seems likely that class
struggle over the other dimensions may also potentially elicit a response from the state in
the form of terrorism. Income inequality and unequal collective labor rights are
intricately bound with land inequality in the shared class interests of the much broader
working and peasant classes that existed historically and those that persist into the
contemporary period. If failed expectations over change in the other dimensions of
exploitation drives the working and peasant classes to engage in class struggle, and state
authorities perceive terrorism as the best strategy to dominate the exploited because it
offers less production and response costs than other strategies, it is likely to be used.
Ultimately, state terrorism is just one of many tools the capitalist state has at its disposal
to maintain the dominance of the capitalist class.

119

References
Abinales, Patricio N., and Donna J. Amoroso. 2005. State and Society in the Philippines.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Amnesty International. 1988. Amnesty International Report: 1988. London, United
Kingdom: Amnesty International Publications.
Amnesty International. 1989. Amnesty International Report: 1989. London, United
Kingdom: Amnesty International Publications.
Amnesty International. 1990. Amnesty International Report: 1990. London, United
Kingdom: Amnesty International Publications.
Antunes, Ricardo. 1994. “Recent Strikes in Brazil: The Main Tendencies of the Strike
Movement of the 1980s.” Latin American Perspectives. 21(1): 24-37. Translated
by Sabrina E. Wilson.
Atienzo, Maria Ela L. 2019. “The 1986 Constitutional Commission and the 1987
Constitution: Background, Processes, and Outputs.” In Chronology of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. ed. Maria Ela L. Atienzo. Quezon City, Philippines:
University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies.
Bacho, Peter. 1987. “Rural Revolt in the Philippines: Threats to Stability?” Journal of
International Affairs. 40(2): 257-270.
Baer, Werner, and Paul Beckerman. 1989. “The Decline and Fall of Brazil’s Cruzado.”
Latin American Research Review. 24(1): 35-64.
Bello, Walden. 1986. “Aquino’s Elite Populism: Initial Reflections.” Third World
Quarterly. 8(3): 1020-1030.
Blakeley, Ruth. 2007. “Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies.” European
Political Science. 6(3): 228-235.
Blakeley, Ruth. 2009. State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Blakeley, Ruth. 2010. “Filling the State Terrorism Gap: Historical Materialism and Its
Explanatory Potential.” Conference Papers--International Studies Association
Annual Meeting. 1-21.
Blakeley, Ruth. 2010. “State Terrorism in the Social Sciences: Theories, Methods and
Concepts.” In Chapter 1 of Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice.
eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY:
Routledge.
120

Blum, William. 1995. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World
War II. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
Boito, Jr., Armando. 1994. “The State and Trade Unionism in Brazil.” Latin American
Perspectives. 21(1): 7-23. Translated by Bill Steiger.
Casper, Gretchen. 2000. “From Confrontation to Conciliation: The Philippine Path
toward Democratic Consolidation.” In Pathways to Democracy: The Political
Economy of Democratic Transitions. eds. James F. Hollifield and Calvin Jillson.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. 1979. The Washington Connection and Third
World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights Volume 1. Chicago, IL:
Haymarket Books. 2014.
Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay. 2014. “The CIRI Human
Rights Dataset.” http://www.humanrightsdata.com. Version 2014.04.14.
Curaming, Rommel A. 2013. “The End of an Illusion: The Mendiola Massacre and
Political Transition in Post-Marcos Philippines.” In State Violence in East Asia.
eds. Sung Chull Kim and N. Ganesan. Lexington, KY: The University Press of
Kentucky.
Demetrio, Andre, and Katya Kozicki. 2019. “Transitional Injustice for Indigenous
Peoples from Brazil.” Revista Direito e Praxis. 10(1): 129-169.
Dixit, Priya, and Jacob L. Stump. 2016. Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies. New
York, NY: Routledge.
Duvall, Raymond D., and Michael Stohl. 1988. “Governance by Terror.” In The Politics
of Terrorism. eds. Michael Stohl. New York, NY: Marce Dekker.
Garcia, Afranio, and Moacir Palmeira. 2009. “Traces of the Big House and the Slave
Quarters: Social Transformation in Rural Brazil during the Twentieth Century.”
In Brazil: A Century of Change. eds. Ignacy Sachs, Jorge Wilheim, and Paulo
Sergio Pinheiro. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
George, Alexander. 1991. Western State Terrorism. New York, NY: Routledge.
Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, Attilio Pisano,
and Gray Barrett. 2019. “The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018.”
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/.
Goodno, James B. 1991. The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises. London, United
Kingdom: Zed Books Ltd.
121

Hamilton, Karine. 2010. “The Deterrence Logic of State Warfare: Israel and the Second
Lebanon War, 2006.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice.
eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herman, Edward S. 1982. The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda.
Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Hernandez, Carolina G. 1989. “The Philippines in 1988: Reaching out to Peace and
Economic Recovery.” Asian Survey. 29(2): 154-164.
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E., and John T. Sidel. 2000. Philippine Politics and Society in the
Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Huggins, Martha K. 1997 “From Bureaucratic Consolidation to Structural Devolution:
Police Death Squads in Brazil.” Policing and Society. 7: 207-234.
Hutchinson, Jane. 2016. “The State and Employment Relations in the Philippines.”
Journal of Industrial Relations. 58(2): 183-198.
Jackson, Richard. 2008. “The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics, and Terrorism
Studies.” Critical Studies on Terrorism. 1(3): 377-392.
Jackson, Richard. 2010. “Conclusion: Contemporary State Terrorism – Towards a New
Research Agenda.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds.
Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Jackson, Richard, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth. 2011. Terrorism:
A Critical Introduction. London, England: Red Globe Press.
Jackson, Richard, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. 2010. “Introduction: Terrorism,
the State and the Study of Political Terror.” In Contemporary State Terrorism:
Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hawes, Gary. 1987. The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

122

Kessler, Richard J. 1989. Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Kinzo, Maria D’Alva, and James Dunkerley. “Introduction.” In Brazil since 1985:
Politics, Economy and Society. eds. Maria D’Alva Kinzo and James Dunkerley.
London, United Kingdom: Institute of Latin American Studies.
Kowalewski, David. 1990. “Vigilante Counterinsurgency and Human Rights in the
Philippines: A Statistical Analysis.” Human Rights Quarterly. 12: 246-64.
Landman, Todd and Marco Larizza. 2018. “Inequality and Human Rights: Who Controls
What, When, and How.” Harvard Dataverse.
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IVBHG
Lasslett, Kristian. 2010. “Winning Hearts and Mines: The Bougainville Crisis, 1988-90.”
In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson,
Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.
Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.
Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. 2016. “Applying Marxism to Critical Terrorism
Studies: Analysis through a Historical Materialist Lens.” In Critical Methods in
Terrorism Studies. eds. Priya Dixit and Jacob L. Stump. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Maisrikrod, Surin. 1999. “Changing Forms of Democracy in Asia? Some Observations
on the Thai and Philippine Constitutions.” Asian Studies Review. 23(3): 355-373.
Marx, Karl. 1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1. London: Penguin.
1990.
Mason, Victoria. 2010. “Revenge and Terror: The Destruction of the Palestinian
Community in Kuwait.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice.
eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY:
Routledge.
McCoy, Alfred W. 2009. Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines,
and the Rise of the Surveillance State. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin
Press.
McCulloch, Jude. 2010. “From Garrison State to Garrison Planet: State Terror, the War
on Terror and the Rise of a Global Carceral Complex.” In Contemporary State
Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott
Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
123

McKeown, Anthony. 2011. “The Structural Production of State Terrorism: Capitalism,
Imperialism and International Class Dynamics.” Critical Studies on Terrorism.
4(1): 75-93.
Mickler, David. 2010. “Darfur’s Dread: Contemporary State Terrorism in the Sudan.” In
Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson,
Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Mosley, Layna. 2011. “Replication Data for: Collective Labor Rights Dataset.” Harvard
Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WVZC90
Murphy, Eamon. 2010. “‘We Have No Orders to Save You’: State Terrorism, Politics
and Communal Violence in the Indian State of Gujurat, 2002.” In Contemporary
State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and
Scott Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Murphy, Eamon, and Aazar Tamana. 2010. “State Terrorism and the Military in
Pakistan.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard
Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Napolitano, Marcus. 2018. “The Brazilian Military Regime, 1964-1985.” Oxford
Research Encyclopedias, Latin American History.
https://doi.org10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.413
Nasr, Sandra. 2010. “Israel’s Other Terrorism Challenge.” In Contemporary State
Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott
Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Official Gazette. “The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.”
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/
Overholt, William H. 1986. “The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos.” Asian Survey.
26(11): 1137-1163.
Parrenas, Julius Caesar. 1993. “Leadership Succession and Security in the Philippines.”
Contemporary Southeast Asia. 15(1): 64-79.
Petras, James. 1987. “The Anatomy of State Terror: Chile, El Salvador and Brazil.”
Science & Society. 51(3): 314-338.
Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio. 2009. “Political Transition and the (Un)Rule of Law in the
Republic” In Brazil: A Century of Change. eds. Ignacy Sachs, Jorge Wilheim, and
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
Poulantzas, Nicos. 1968. Political Power and Social Classes. London, WI: Verso. 1978.
124

Poynting, Scott. 2010. “‘We are All in Guantanamo’: State Terror and the Case of
Mamdouh Habib.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds.
Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Raphael, Sam. 2010. “Paramilitarism and State Terror in Colombia.” In Contemporary
State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and
Scott Poynting. New York, NY: Routledge.
Robinson, William I. 2004. A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State
in a Transnational World. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.
Rocamora, Joel. 1991. “Discontent in the Philippines.” World Policy Journal. 8(4): 633661.
Robles, Wilder. 2018. “Revisiting Agrarian Reform in Brazil, 1985-2016.” Journal of
Developing Societies. 34(1): 1-34.
Schneider, Ronald M. 1991. “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Schirmer, Daniel B., and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. eds. 1987. “Selection 10.1:
Program of Social Reform, Corazon Aquino.” In The Philippines Reader: A
History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance. eds.
Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Boston, MA: South End
Press.
Serbin, Kenneth P. Serbin. 2019. “The Ghosts of Brazil’s Military Dictatorship: How a
Politics of Forgetting Led to Bolsonaro’s Rise.” Foreign Affairs.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2019-01-01/ghosts-brazils-militarydictatorship
Skidmore, Thomas E. 1989. The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Skidmore, Thomas E. 2010. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Skidmore Thomas E., Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. 2010. Modern Latin America.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Smyth, Marie Breen, Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, George Kassimeris, and Piers
Robinson. 2008. “Critical Studies on Terrorism – An Introduction.” Critical
Studies on Terrorism. 1(1): 1-4.

125

Solt, Frederick. 2019. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Version 8.”
Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LM4OWF
Stohl, Michael. 1988. “States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the
Superpowers.” In Current Perspectives on International Terrorism. eds. Robert
O. Slater and Michael Stohl. New York, NY: St. Michael’s Press.
United States Institute of Peace. 2021. “Commission of Inquiry: Brazil.”
https://www.usip.org/publications/1979/01/commission-inquiry-brazil
van der Velden, Sjaak. 2018. “Strikes_ILO_1927-2008.” IISH Data Collection.
https://hdl.handle.net/10622/B0CHA9
Wardrop, Joan. 2010. “The Politics of Convenient Silence in Southern Africa: Relocating
the Terrorism of the State.” In Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and
Practice. eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy, and Scott Poynting. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Welch, Cliff. 2006. “Keeping Communism down on the Farm: The Brazilian Labor
Movement during the Cold War.” Latin American Perspectives. 33(3): 28-50.
Weyland, Kurt. 1997-1998. “The Brazilian State in the New Democracy.” Journal of
Interamerican studies and World Affairs. 39(4): 63-94.
Wright, Erik Olin. 2005. “Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis.” In Approaches
to Class Analysis. ed. Erik Olin Wright. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Zirker, Daniel. 1993. “The Military Ministers and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian
Brazil.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. 18(35): 87110.

126

